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Abstract:  
This research exploits novel evidence on current and historical inequality dynamics, as 
well as an instrumental variable (IV) strategy (founded on historical settler mortality à 
la Acemoglu et al.), to document the fundamental role of income redistribution 
through taxes and transfers in accounting for differences in inequality across regions 
and historical periods. This research challenges the conventional wisdom about the 
origins of world-leading inequality levels in Latin America, India or Africa, arguing 
that inequality is not rooted in the colonial period nor are current inequality levels 
explained by supposedly persistent “extractive” economic institutions maintaining an 
unequal playing field. De facto, Latin America, Africa and India have had, in most 
cases, lower inequality levels than Western countries (i.e. Western Europe and its 
Offshoots) until the early 20th century. Before this period, no different than in 
colonized nations, Western countries had a regressive fiscal system which required the 
poorest taxpayers to fund public services that benefited richer households. The IV 
strategy, and the evidence on inequality dynamics, both indicate that contemporary 
inequality differences are a product of the 20th century. The emergence of 
redistributive policies due to democratization, which have taken place in the past 
century, have led to an exceptional inequality reduction in Western countries. Despite 
that Latin America and India have converged towards “inclusive” economic 
institutions, high inequality has persisted through a regressive fiscal equilibrium which 
still is largely in place due to a slower democratization process.  
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Latin America and India are well-known as being among the most unequal places in the world, 
with world-leading income inequality levels that are roughly 50% higher than in Western Europe, 
Western offshoots (i.e. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the US) or East Asia.1 The seminal 
work of Engerman and Sokoloff (1994, 2002) henceforth ES, and of Acemoglu, Johnson and 
 
* Submitted in partial fulfilment of the MSc in Economic History, 2019-20. Email: Andres_igh@hotmail.com 
1 ‘OECD Income Distribution Database (IDD): Gini, Poverty, Income, Methods and Concepts - OECD’. Accessed 
20 June 2020. https://www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-database.htm.  
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Robinson (2001, 2002, 2005) hereafter AJR, have famously stressed the colonial origins of these 
inequality differences and their persistence through historically-determined economic institutions.2  
 
These authors and a series of follow-up studies, e.g. Easterly (2007) and Nunn (2008), have 
stressed that “extractive” colonialism in Latin America, India and Africa, led the formation of 
“extractive” economic institutions designed to serve the elite at the expense of the bulk of the 
population.3 Namely, rules and practices which systematically undermine equality of opportunity 
and broad-access to capital accumulation by restraining, notably, access to secure property rights, 
education and career choices to non-elite households.4 Whereas in “settler colonies” where 
Europeans settled in large numbers, referred to as  “Western offshoots”, ES and AJR  argue that 
“settler” colonialism led to the emergence of “inclusive” institutions guaranteeing a more level 
economic playing field, e.g. broader access to education and ownership rights.5 At the same time, 
this literature has also stressed that colonialism also promoted an early emergence of “inclusive” 
institutions in Western Europe, where exposure to the Atlantic trade (inaugurated by colonization) 
 
2 These ideas are well summarized in Sokoloff, Kenneth and James A. Robinson. Chapter IV “Historical Roots of 
Inequality in Latin America” in Inequality in Latin America: Breaking with History? The World Bank, 2004. 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/15009 ; Please also see Engerman, Stanley L., and Kenneth 
L. Sokoloff. ‘Factor Endowments: Institutions, and Differential Paths of Growth Among New World Economies: A 
View from Economic Historians of the United States’. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 
Series, 1 December 1994. https://www.nber.org/papers/h0066; Engerman, Stanley L., and Kenneth L. Sokoloff. 
‘Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development Among New World Economics’. National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper Series, 10 October 2002. https://www.nber.org/papers/w9259; Acemoglu, 
Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical 
Investigation’. American Economic Review 91, no. 5 (2001): 1369–1401; Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and 
James A. Robinson. ‘Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income 
Distribution’. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, no. 4 (1 November 2002): 1231–94. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302320935025; Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 
‘Chapter 6 Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth’. In Handbook of Economic Growth, edited by 
Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf, 1:385–472. Elsevier, 2005.   https://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-
0684(05)01006-3.  
3The main channels identified by the literature on how “extractive” economic institutions promote inequality are: an 
unequal distribution of human capital (Mariscal and Sokoloff, 2000; Easterly 2007) and an unequal concentration of 
wealth. The latter being explained by institutionalized land inequality (ES; Banerjee et al, 2015; Frankema 2005), 
limited access to credit (Haber, 2011) and through an unequal allocation of secure ownership rights (AJR). Please see 
Mariscal, Elisa, and Kenneth Sokoloff. ‘Schooling, Suffrage and the Persistence of Inequality in the Americas’. 
Political Institutions and Economic Growth in Latin America: Essays in Policy, History and Political Economy. 
Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 2000, 159–218; Easterly, William. ‘Inequality Does Cause Underdevelopment: 
Insights from a New Instrument’. Journal of Development Economics 84, no. 2 (1 November 2007): 755–76. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2006.11.002; Nunn, Nathan. ‘Slavery, Inequality, and Economic Development in 
the Americas’. Institutions and Economic Performance 15 (2008): 148–180; Banerjee, Abhijit, and Lakshmi Iyer. 
‘History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India’. 
American Economic Review 95, no. 4 (2005): 1190–1213; Frankema, Ewout HP. ‘The Colonial Origins of 
Inequality: Exploring the Causes and Consequences of Land Distribution’. Discussion papers//Ibero America 
Institute for Economic Research, 2005; Haber, Stephen. ‘Politics and Banking Systems’. In NBER Chapters, 245–
94. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, 2011. https://ideas.repec.org/h/nbr/nberch/12611.html. 
4 Please see for instance Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity 
and Poverty. London, UNITED KINGDOM: Profile Books, 2012. Page 75-79 
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/londonschoolecons/reader.action?docID=1743163 
5 Idem.  
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expanded economic opportunities and led to political change towards less institutionalized 
inequality.6 
 
Following the influence of the institutional literature à la ES and AJR, there is an emerging 
consensus that considers that: (I) comparative inequality levels are fundamentally determined by 
historically-determined divergent institutions which promote (or undermine) a level economic 
playing field, and (II) that these persistent institutional arrangements (“inclusive” or “extractive” 
and its associated inequality levels) can be traced back to the colonial period.7 For the rest of this 
paper, the first part of the consensus will be referred as the “institutional hypothesis”, while the 
second part will be referred as the “historical narrative” of AJR and ES.   
 
This paper proposes an original contribution to the research on the origins of comparative 
inequality across regions and its historical evolution, documenting the crucial role of fiscal 
redistribution and state capacity over the primacy of economic institutions developed by ES and 
AJR. To do so, this research develops an empirical and historical exploration into the origins of 
world-leading inequality levels in Latin America, Africa and India, based on novel comparative 
evidence on current and historical inequality dynamics – covering an exceptionally wide range 
of countries since colonial times until today. Then, the investigation follows an instrumental 
variable (IV) research strategy founded on settler mortality which builds on AJR (2001), to 
identify the impact of a history of democracy on inequality and redistributive dynamics.  
 
The research questions that structure this investigation are: (I) What are the historical origins of 
comparative inequality levels across regions and countries? (II) Does the empirical evidence 
indicate that different levels of inequality are explained by divergent economic institutions rooted 
in the colonial period? And (III) what is the role played by state capacity and redistribution in 
explaining historical inequality dynamics? 
 
 
6 Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. ‘The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional 
Change, and Economic Growth’. American Economic Review 95, no. 3 (2005): 546–579. 
7 The institutional hypothesis (that inequality is embedded in “extractive” economic institutions) and the historical 
narrative (emphasising institutional persistence) inaugurated by ES, developed by AJR and epitomized in Why Nations 
Fails (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012), is now widely shared by international organisations – such as the World Bank,  
the UN ECLAC or the OECD. Please see for instance De Ferranti, David, Guillermo E. Perry, Francisco Ferreira, 
and Michael Walton. Inequality in Latin America: Breaking with History? The World Bank, 2004; UN ECLAC 2018, 
Chapter IV “Institutions and the culture of privilege” in CEPAL, NU. The Inefficiency of Inequality. ECLAC, 2018. 
https://repositorio.cepal.org//handle/11362/43443; OECD 2018 “Chapter 3. Institutions to make the state deliver 
in Latin America and the Caribbean” in OECD, CAF Development Bank of Latin America, and UN ECLAC. Latin 
American Economic Outlook 2018: Rethinking Institutions for Development. Latin American Economic Outlook. 
OECD, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1787/leo-2018-en  
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As we shall see, the institutional thesis as well as the historical narrative of AJR and ES are deeply 
flawed. The evidence on inequality dynamics suggest that the persistence of “extractive” 
economic institutions arising from colonialism, as well as the colonial origins of comparative 
inequality levels, are a myth. Instead, the empirical and historical investigation developed in this 
paper suggests that what explains comparative high inequality levels in India, Latin America and 
Africa, is a limited fiscal redistribution rooted in a weak state capacity that arises from a short 
history of participatory democracy.  
 
This argument will be presented and developed in six sections. In Section II, we will first describe 
the data and methodology used to construct comparable and reliable distributive statistics across 
nations and historical periods. Then, we will develop an analytical framework which maps the 
relationship between economic institutions, redistributive capacity and inequality dynamics 
within countries. Based on this framework, Section III demonstrates that what matters for 
explaining world-leading inequality levels in Latin America or India is a relatively regressive fiscal 
system rooted in a weak state capacity, and not an unequal economic playing field or 
“institutionalized” wealth concentration – therefore debunking AJR and ES thesis. Section IV, 
explores the historical origins of comparative inequality levels and a regressive fiscal system in 
Latin America, India and Africa, arguing that Western Europe and colonized nations, before the 
20th century, all had high inequality levels rooted in a regressive fiscal systems which benefited 
richer households. Section V and VI outline and discuss the Instrumental Variable (IV) strategy, 
as well as historical evidence and case studies. The results of the IV strategy and the historical 
evidence developed in these last two sections suggest that the emergence of participatory 
democracies during the early 20th century, involving mass political participation and electoral 
competition, started to produce tangibly different rates of inequality following the emergence of 
redistribution in Western countries. Whereas in Latin America and India, despite a convergence 
towards “inclusive” economics institutions during post-colonial times, a regressive fiscal 
equilibrium maintaining high inequality levels is still largely in place due to a slower 
democratization process.  
 
 
II  Mapping Income Inequality  
II.1 Measuring Income Inequality across time and space 
This research is structured around a long-term comparative perspective on income inequality and 
on a quantitative IV approach studying the historical determinants of current inequality and 
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redistribution levels. Therefore, ensuring the quality and comparability of data across countries 
and historical periods is a fundamental challenge of this research strategy. To address this 
challenge, we will start by describing the methodology and sources used here to quantify both 
historical and current distributive statistics.  
 
Concerning the historical measures on income inequality, the data used in this investigation comes 
from different publications which have estimated inequality following the methodology developed 
by Milanovich, Lindert and Williamson (2011) and match a set of standards to ensure the reliability 
and consistency of these estimations.8 The methodology of Milanovich et al. allows to obtain 
comparable distributive statistics for pre-modern societies using “social tables”, in other words, 
historical records, which provide evidence on income differences across different social groups 
and their respective population – such as censuses. This methodology is preferred as it permits not 
only to obtain comparable inequality estimates across societies and historical periods, but also 
because it has been largely used by researchers, thus providing us with abundant comparative 
evidence on historical inequality dynamics.9 Concerning the standards related to the consistency 
of the data, all the historical distributive statistics used in this research consider both slave and free 
households – as not doing so would underestimate inequality estimations in slave societies.10 For 
instance, the Gini coefficient for the US South in 1776 for free population only is 0.34 (equivalent 
to modern New Zealand) as opposed to 0.46 (equivalent to modern Mexico) once slaves 
households are included. 11 This research will therefore use the latter estimate to account for 
inequality across the whole of society. Concerning the criterion to ensure the reliability of the data, 
we only include estimations based on historical records providing sufficient details and 
representative evidence to compute distributive statistics for the whole of society.12 This selection 
 
8 Milanovic, Branko, Peter H. Lindert, and Jeffrey G. Williamson. ‘Pre-Industrial Inequality’. The Economic Journal 
121, no. 551 (2011): 255–272.  
9 For instance, the latest publication by Milanovic (2018) includes some of the new comparable estimates on historical 
distributive statistic following this methodology – after this publication in 2018 new estimates has also been published 
as for colonial Jamaica. Please see Milanovic, Branko. ‘Towards an Explanation of Inequality in Premodern Societies: 
The Role of Colonies, Urbanization, and High Population Density’. The Economic History Review 71, no. 4 (2018): 
1029–1047; Burnard, Trevor, Laura Panza, and Jeffrey Williamson. ‘Living Costs, Real Incomes and Inequality in 
Colonial Jamaica’. Explorations in Economic History 71 (2019): 55–71.  
10 More specifically, here consistency should be understood in the sense that (a) this criteria permits to compare 
societies across time – because if we only measure income differences between free households after the abolition of 
slavery the degree of inequality in a given society would artificially increase as ex-lave households which are typically 
poor would now be included in the estimations, and (b) this criterion allows us to compare inequality across different 
societies at a given time by following an unified criterion (i.e. income differences across all households)  -as researchers 
publish inequality estimates also for free household only.  
11 Lindert, Peter H., and Jeffrey G. Williamson. ‘Unequal Gains: American Growth and Inequality since 1700’. Juncture 22, 
no. 4 (2016): 276–283. Table C-5; OECD IDD 
12 These records correspond to “full social tables” (following Milanovic et al categories) which include evidence on 
all the main social groups and their respective income. 
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excludes inequality estimates based on partial records, which account for a small section of society 
and (or) that do not include information on key social groups – such as on colonizers in a colonial 
context and (or) about the slave population in a slave society. For a comprehensive review of 
historical estimates used and not used in this research (based on the criteria exposed above) please 
see Appendix A. Most of the historical inequality estimates used in this paper are available online 
at the UC Davis Global Price and Income History database – which this research consulted to 
examine the estimations based on the criteria exposed above.13 Concerning its rigour, all these 
estimations have been published in peer-reviewed and renowned journals in economics and 
economic history.14 
 
With respect to the data on current redistribution and inequality levels, the statistics used in this 
investigation are based on the methodology of the OECD Income Distribution Database 
(hereafter OECD IDD), dataset and methodology which can also be consulted online.15 This 
dataset includes comparable inequality statistics before and after taxes across a wide range of 
developed and developing countries.16 This investigation uses the OECD dataset as it is highly 
valued and used by researchers and policy analysts, and because it allows for a comparative 
assessment of statistics on inequality and fiscal redistribution.17 Importantly for this research, the 
UN ECLAC has used the methodology of the OECD IDD to obtain internationally comparable 
inequality and redistributive measures for Latin America.18 Based on this, the data used in this 
research is a combination of the OECD IDD and ECLAC calculations (founded on the OECD 
methodology) which allows us to have an internationally comparable dataset on inequality and 
redistribution for a set of 57 countries, including 24 former colonies covering several continents.19 
The resulting dataset gives us an exceptionally abundant and detailed evidence on redistribution 
and inequality across the full income distribution (i.e., covering from poor to rich households) 
which cannot be found in other international databases. For instance, the World Inequality 
Database (WID) focuses on top income shares which are calculated using fiscal data (following 
 
13 ‘GPIH - Early Income Distributions’. Accessed 16 July 2020. https://gpih.ucdavis.edu/Distribution.htm.  
14 These journals are the Economics Journal (Milanovic et al, 2011), the Economic History Review (Milanovich, 
2018), Explorations in Economic History (Burnard et al, 2019), among others – please see Annex A.  
15 OECD Income Distribution Database (IDD): Gini, Poverty, Income, Methods and Concepts - OECD’. Accessed 
20 June 2020. https://www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-database.htm.  
16 The OECD IDD includes all OECD countries, as well as Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Costa Rica, India, Romania, the 
Russian Federation and South Africa. 
17 Gasparini, Leonardo, and Leopoldo Tornarolli. ‘A Review of the OECD Income Distribution Database’. The 
Journal of Economic Inequality 13, no. 4 (2015): 579–602.  
18 Hanni, Michael, Ricardo Martner Fanta, and Andrea Podestá. ‘The Redistributive Potential of Taxation in Latin 
America’, August 2015. https://repositorio.cepal.org//handle/11362/39603.  
19 Besides the Americas, the dataset includes Africa (South Africa), Oceania (New Zealand and Australia), and Asia 
(India).  
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the methodology pioneered by Piketty et al.) and therefore lacks the sufficient detail to analyse 
inequality and redistribution across the full income distribution.20 The other main datasets on 
inequality either cover a lower number of former colonies such as the Luxembourg Income Study 
(LIS) database,21 or the database, while covering many countries, is not standardized (therefore not 
comparable) nor does it include inequality measures before and after taxes and transfers. This 
includes the Gini coefficients collected by the World Bank.22 
 
Therefore, and as summarized in Figure 1, the data on modern inequality and redistribution 
statistics quoted and used (as in figures and regressions) in the rest of this paper is based on the 
combination of the OECD IDD and ECLAC calculations – see details in Annex A. While the 
figures presenting comparative evidence on historical inequality (before the 20th century) are based 
on the methodology developed by Milanovic et al. and follow the criteria expose above. 
 
Figure 1. Summary of Distributive Statistics  
 
Data and Description Methodology Main Sources 
Modern Distributive 
Statistics 
[Income inequality before and 
after taxes and transfers and 
the extent of redistribution] 
OECD Income Distribution 
Database  
[Based on national microdata surveys 
(household level) covering the full 
income distribution] 
 OECD and ECLAC 
calculations 
[Combination of the OECD 
IDD and Hanni et al (2015) to 
cover the countries in Latin 
America not included in the 
OECD IDD, see details in 
Annex A] 
Historical Distributive 
Statistics 
[Income inequality measures 
based on historical evidence] 
Milanovic et al (2011)  
[Based on social tables i.e. historical 
records providing evidence on income 
differences across all main social 
groups, including slaves] 
Different Publications  
[Including Milanovic et al (2011), 
Williamson and Lindert (2016), 
and Milanovic (2018), among 
others – see Annex A] 
 
 
II.2 A framework on inequality dynamics 
Before exploring the determinants and evolution of economic inequality differences across 
countries based on the data described above, it is fundamental to develop a framework to map 
 
20Because the WID methodology is based on fiscal data, the dataset does not present inequality measures across the 
full distribution because states typically do not have data on poorer households. Namely, because poor households 
are not included in fiscal records as they are typically exempted from paying income taxes. Please see WID - World 
Inequality Database. Accessed 16 July 2020. https://wid.world/.  
21 ‘LIS Cross-National Data Center in Luxembourg’. Accessed 16 July 2020. https://www.lisdatacenter.org/.  
22  Branko L. Milanovic, All the Ginis Dataset, World Bank Group. Accessed 16 July 2020. 
https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/all-ginis-dataset  
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income inequality dynamics within countries. Namely, because, despite a large and increasing body 
of research dealing with income distribution, there is still much confusion on the components of 
income inequality and how economic institutions and redistribution relate to inequality dynamics.23 
As noted by Atkinson and Bourguignon (2015), there is a lack of clarity on what comprises income 
inequality e.g., if it does include both income from work and capital, and on how tax-and-transfers 
systems affect inequality dynamics.24 
 
Here, following the definition of the OECD and the World Bank, Income inequality corresponds 
to the extent of disposable income differences between households in a given country, including 
both income from work and capital.25 The extent of these income differences results from the 
interaction of market income inequality, i.e. income disparities before taxes and transfers, with 
the redistributive capacity of the state, i.e. the degree of income redistribution through taxes and 
transfers.26 
 
Market income inequality, hereafter referred as market inequality,  is determined by the market 
returns (wages and rents) to the efforts and assets (accumulated wealth and human capital) of 
individuals, and by the underlying distribution of opportunities and of those assets across 
households.27 With respect to the dynamics of market inequality, the more unequal the distribution 
of opportunities and assets is, i.e. when privileges (as opposed to discrimination), wealth and 
human capital are concentrated among few households, the extent of market income differences 
will be higher. As such, discrimination based on observable characteristics such as ethnicity, social 
class or gender, translates into inequality of opportunity and thus leads to high market inequality 
levels – as the discriminated groups receive lower income.28 Concerning assets, constrained access 
 
23 Atkinson, Anthony B., and François Bourguignon. ‘Introduction: Income Distribution Today’. In Handbook of 
Income Distribution, edited by Anthony B. Atkinson and François Bourguignon, 2:xvii–lxiv. Handbook of Income 
Distribution. Elsevier, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-59428-0.09989-6.  
24 Idem.  
25 Disposable income of households is taken as the preferred unit of observation as it captures the capacity of 
individuals within a certain household to access good and services. Concerning the components of disposable income, 
it includes market income (i.e. pre-tax earnings) from work, self-employment, and wealth (capital rents), after adding 
public cash transfers (social benefits including pensions) and deducting social security contributions and taxes paid by 
households.  Please see Causa, Orsetta, and Mikkel Nørlem Hermansen. ‘Income Redistribution through Taxes and 
Transfers across OECD Countries’. Working Paper. LIS Working Paper Series, 2018; Goni, Edwin Lopez, J. 
Humberto Serven, Luis. Fiscal Redistribution and Income Inequality in Latin America. Policy Research Working 
Papers. The World Bank, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-4487. 
26Idem.  
27 Goni, Edwin Lopez, J. Humberto Serven, Luis. Fiscal Redistribution … 
28 Namely because discriminated groups face higher entry barriers to the labour market and receive lower earnings 
for a given level of productivity. Please see Roemer, John E., and Alain Trannoy. ‘Chapter 4 - Equality of 
Opportunity’. In Handbook of Income Distribution, edited by Anthony B. Atkinson and François Bourguignon, 
2:217–300. Handbook of Income Distribution. Elsevier, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-59428-
0.00005-9. 
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to education or to secure property rights should increase market inequality as they hinder the 
capacity of most individuals to accumulate human capital and wealth while promoting the 
concentration of ownership (and returns) among the privileged few who have access. For instance, 
countries which provide open-access to education tend to have lower market inequality levels vis 
à vis nations with limited access to education, notably because a higher supply of education leads 
to a lower skill premium.29 Similarly, open-access to health services also has an equalizing effect 
on market disparities as it levels the playing field in terms incidence of illness and disability, factors 
which affects productivity (thus wages) as well as the capacity to accumulate human capital.30  
 
Concerning the extent of redistribution, the redistributive capacity of the state is fundamentally 
determined by the incidence of fiscal action, i.e. the size and progressivity of taxes and transfers. 31 
That is to say, the more substantial and progressive (when its incidence falls more heavily on richer 
rather than poor households) taxes are, and the more generous and targeted at poorer households 
social benefits (i.e. transfers) are, the extent of redistribution will be higher, translating into lower 
income differences between rich and poor households, – and vice versa in the context of a 
regressive taxes-and-transfers system. Concerning its measurement, redistribution is quantified as 
the relative decline in market inequality after the effects of tax-and-transfer systems. For example, 
the extent of redistribution is 50% if market inequality stands at a 0.50 Gini coefficient, and after 
taxes and transfers, income inequality drops to a 0.25 disposable income Gini. 
 
Therefore, based on the framework developed above, “inclusive” economic institutions à la 
Acemoglu and Robinson, i.e. which guarantee open access to education, health, property rights 
enforcement and distributive justice in general (non-discriminatory rules and practices), should 
lead to a level economic playing field and therefore to low market inequality levels.32 Whereas 
“extractive” institutions should have the opposite effects as they are designed to  benefit  the elite 
 
29 Lopez, J. Humberto, and Guillermo Perry. Inequality in Latin America: Determinants and Consequences. The 
World Bank, 2008. 
30 O’Donnell, Owen, Eddy Van Doorslaer, and Tom Van Ourti. ‘Chapter 17 - Health and Inequality’. In Handbook 
of Income Distribution, edited by Anthony B. Atkinson and François Bourguignon, 2:1419–1533. Handbook of 
Income Distribution. Elsevier, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-59429-7.00018-2. 
31 Orsetta, and Mikkel Nørlem Hermansen. ‘Income Redistribution through Taxes and Transfers..; Goni, Edwin 
Lopez, J. Humberto Serven, Luis. Fiscal Redistribution and Income Inequality.. 
32“Inclusive economic institutions (…) are those that allow and encourage participation by the great mass of people in economic activities 
that make best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals to make the choices they wish. To be inclusive, economic 
institutions must feature secure private property, an unbiased system of law, and a provision of public services that provides a level playing 
field in which people can exchange and contract; it also must permit the entry of new businesses and allow people to choose their careers” 
(Acemoglu and Robison, 2012, Page 74). Please see Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. Why Nations Fail: 
The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty. London, UNITED KINGDOM: Profile Books, 2012. 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/londonschoolecons/detail.action?docID=1743163.  
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at the expense of the bulk of the population.33 In turn, the degree to which asset and opportunities 
disparities (arising from these institutions) translate into disposable income inequality, is 
determined by the capacity of taxes-and-transfers systems to tackle market income differences 
(arising from these disparities) through redistribution,34 as summarized in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Disentangling income inequality and its components 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Assets includes both wealth and embedded assets such as human capital and health. As such, and based on 
the OECD methodology, in-kind public transfers such as free (or subsidised) access to public education and health 
affect income inequality through market inequality (by reducing asset disparities) and are not included in redistribution 
–as the latter only includes cash transfers.  
Source: The Figure is my own and based on the relevant literature on inequality dynamics – please see for instance 
Goni et al. (2008) and Causa et al. (2018).35 
 
 
As such, economic institutions and its effects on market inequality, as well as the redistributive 
capacity and its impact through the extent of redistribution, are both essential to understand the 
inequality dynamics within countries. But then, what are the determinants of these economic 
institutions and capacities, and which matter most for explaining inequality differences across 
countries? 
 
 
 
 
33 Idem. Pages 73-81.  
34 Goni, Edwin Lopez, J. Humberto Serven, Luis. Fiscal Redistribution.. 
35 Goni, Edwin Lopez, J. Humberto Serven, Luis. Fiscal Redistribution..; Orsetta, and Mikkel Nørlem Hermansen. 
‘Income Redistribution through Taxes and Transfers across OECD Countries’ 
Economic Institutions 
Relative access to education, 
health, secure property rights 
and unbiased justice.  
 
Market Inequality 
Pre-taxes-and-transfers income 
differences between households.  
[Reflects the distribution of  assets and 
opportunities and its associated 
market returns] 
Redistribution  
The effects of  direct taxes  
& public cash transfers.  
[Reflects the state capacity to 
redistribute income]  
 
Redistributive Capacity  
The size and progressivity of  
tax-and-transfers systems. 
Income Inequality 
Disposable income 
differences between 
households. 
 [Reflects relative access to 
goods and services]  
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III. Applying the framework on inequality 
III.1 Institutions and the economic playing field: testing AJR and ES  
Based on the framework on inequality dynamics developed before, if the institutional thesis of 
AJR and ES is correct, we should expect high market inequality levels in places with historically-
determined “extractive” economic institutions maintaining an unequal distribution of asset and 
opportunities since colonization, such as in Latin America or India. Accordingly, we should 
observe that countries which have “inclusive” institutions should have lower market inequality 
such as the US or Western Europe.   
 
However, as shown in Figure 3 below, the empirical evidence rejects AJR and ES hypothesis (and 
the conventional wisdom) as there are no significant differences in terms of market inequality 
between places which experienced different types of colonization (“extractive” or “settler”), nor 
between colonizers (i.e. Western Europe) and its former “extractive” colonies, i.e. Latin America 
and India. Market inequality (which reflects assets and opportunities disparities) is not especially 
high in Latin America nor India, even when compared to Western countries which arguably have 
“inclusive” economic institutions, i.e. broad access to health, education and a relatively level 
playing field. In fact, market income differences – which includes income from work, self-
employment and capital gains, in both India and Latin America stand at a similar level to Western 
Europe (around a 0.51-0.50 market inequality Gini) and slightly above the OECD average (0.47) 
– as depicted in Figure 3. At the same time, the main (former) colonializing nations show similar 
market inequality levels to their colonies, the UK has 0.50 Gini vs. 0.51 in both India (“extractive” 
colony) and the US (“settler” colony). Similarly, market inequality in Spain, is no different than in 
the average Latin American country. Even in the Andean region, the canonical example of 
“extractive” colonialism related to labour exploitation as under the Mita in silver mining or the 
Encomienda system in haciendas in Peru and Bolivia– see for instance Dell (2010),36 today has a 
lower market inequality than the US or Western Europe. Similarly, India which is typically seen as 
the poster child of institutionalized inequality rooted in a discriminatory caste system serving the 
elites (upper casts), also has a rather average market inequality level – that is even lower than in 
France (0.52) and comparable to Finland (0,51).  
 
 
36 Dell, Melissa. ‘The Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining Mita’. Econometrica 78, no. 6 (2010): 1863–1903. 
https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA8121.  
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Figure 3. Persistent asset and opportunities disparities in India and Latin America? 
Market inequality in comparative perspective circa 2016 
 
   
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Market inequality measures income differences across households (including income from work, self -employment and capital) before taxes and transfers – following the 
OECD methodology. The market inequality Gini coefficients are calculated based on unweighted regional averages, being ordered from the highest to the lowest Gini. The 
regions and countries presented in this figure were selected based on the availability of comparable and reliable data on market inequality as explained in the “Mapping Inequality” 
section. Please see the countries included in each region in appendix A. 
 
Sources: Own elaboration based on OECD and UN ECLAC calculations as explained in the “Mapping Inequality” section. As noted before, all the estimations used here are 
based on the OECD IDD methodology and therefore are comparable.   
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As a further robustness check on AJR and ES hypothesis we will also study wealth inequality as 
the literature has emphasised the persistence of an “institutionalized” wealth concentra tion 
benefiting the elite in formerly extractive colonies, e.g. ES has emphasized restricted access to 
land and AJR an unequal distribution of secure property rights. However, consistent with the 
market inequality levels observed above, the available evidence indicates that the persistence of 
institutions maintaining an exceptionally unequal distribution of wealth in Latin America or India 
seems to be a myth.  As shown in Figure 4, wealth inequality (including financial and non-
financial assets) is not especially high in Latin America, Africa nor India. Even the classical 
comparison between Latin America, which is depicted as having historically-determined 
“extractive” institutions vis à vis North America is not sustained by the comparative evidence, 
as the latter is characterized by a higher concentration of wealth. As such, consistent with its 
rather unexceptional market inequality levels, wealth concentration levels in Latin America and 
India are also far from being exceptionally high, casting severe doubts on AJR and ES´s 
institutional hypothesis. 
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Figure 4. Debunking “institutionalized” inequality in Latin America, Africa and India: 
Wealth inequality across world regions and selected countries in 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes & Sources:  Own elaboration. The data is based on the data presented in the latest Global Wealth Report and Databook (Davies, Lluberas and Shorrocks, 2019).37 This 
source corresponds to the most comprehensive dataset on wealth statistics across different regions, analysing the household w ealth of 5 billion people worldwide. For instance, 
the OECD uses this Databook to verify their wealth inequality database.38 The results are similar if we use the OECD dataset.39  
 
37 Davies, Lluberas and Shorrocks. ‘Global Wealth Report and Databook’. Accessed 7 August 2020. https://www.credit-suisse.com/about-us/en/reports-research/global-wealth-
report.html.  
38 Balestra, Carlotta, and Richard Tonkin. ‘Inequalities in Household Wealth across OECD Countries: Evidence from the OECD Wealth Distribution Database’, 21 June 2018. 
https://doi.org/10.1787/7e1bf673-en. 
39 The OECD Wealth Distribution dataset show that in Chile, the only Latin American country in this database, the top 10% richest households own 58% of total net wealth vis à 
vis 79% in the US – which despite it supposedly “inclusive” economic institutions is the country with the most extreme wealth concentration in the OECD dataset. Please see Balestra, 
Carlotta, and Richard Tonkin. ‘Inequalities in Household Wealth across OECD Countries.  
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The only exceptions are South Africa and Brazil, which have exceptionally high market inequality 
levels as Figure 4 shows, being the highest in the sample. Consistent with literature which has 
emphasized the persistent effects of slavery on inequality, e.g. ES and Nunn (2008), asset and 
opportunities disparities have remained high in places which experienced extensive slavery 
during colonization –especially given that slavery is the most extreme form of institutionalized 
exploitation.40 Nevertheless, widespread slavery, as in Brazil and South Africa or in the 
Caribbean, was the exception and not the rule.  All the other former colonies had a significantly 
lower prevalence of slavery as Figure 5 shows. In Spanish America, indigenous slavery was 
prohibited since the 1540s as forced labour institutions were progressively eliminated following 
depopulation concerns related to pandemics and indigenous exploitation during the early 
colonial period.41 Similarly, although because of different reasons, most colonized regions were 
spared from intensive labour exploitation under slavery as they were colonized during the post-
chattel-slavery era (in the 19th century) such as most of Africa, Australia, New Zealand and the 
Indian Subcontinent.42 For instance, British colonization in India (as in other areas following the 
abolition of slavery by the British) actively prohibited slavery and other types of forced labour 
such as debt bondage, which was relatively widespread before colonization.43 It is therefore not 
a coincidence that places which actually experienced extensive slavery such as South Africa and 
Brazil (see Figure 5) have today high market inequality levels (Figure 3), while all the rest of the 
former colonies (where slavery was significantly less widespread), such as India and Latin 
American countries have comparable market inequality levels with Western countries and other 
regions. 
 
40 Nunn, Nathan. ‘Slavery, Inequality, and Economic Development in the Americas’. Institutions and Economic 
Performance 15 (2008): 148–180.  
41 Arroyo Abad, Leticia, Elwyn Davies, and Jan Luiten van Zanden. ‘Between Conquest and Independence: Real 
Wages and Demographic Change in Spanish America, 1530–1820’. Explorations in Economic History 49, no. 2 (1 
April 2012): 149–66. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eeh.2011.12.001.  
42 Eltis, David, and Stanley L. Engerman. ‘Dependence, Servility, and Coerced Labor in Time and Space’. In The 
Cambridge World History of Slavery.  
43 Stanziani, Alessandro. ‘Slavery in India’. In The Cambridge World History of Slavery: Volume 4: AD 1804–AD 
2016, edited by David Eltis, David Richardson, Seymour Drescher, and Stanley L. Engerman, 4:246–71. The 
Cambridge World History of Slavery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139046176.012.  
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Figure 5: The extent of slavery during colonialism circa 1750-1790s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Australia and New Zealand are not included as during most of its colonial period (which started later than in the Americas) s lavery was already abolished. Similarly, India 
is not included as the colonial period also stared later and, in any case, there is  no evidence on extensive slavery as in the Caribbean, South Africa or Brazil i.e. widespread chattel 
slavery.44  
Sources:  Own elaboration based on data from Lindert and Williamson (2016) in the case of the US, 45 while the data for the Caribbean, Canada and Latin America are from 
Nunn (2008), and Fourie et al. (2011) for South Africa.46 The data presented by Nunn (2008) is revised in the case Chile and Uruguay using country-specific historical demographics 
(based on censuses), as Nunn (2008) made some mistakes in his interpretation of historical evidence. Please see Appendix A for details.  
 
 
44 Idem. 
45 Lindert, Peter H., and Jeffrey G. Williamson. Unequal Gains: American Growth and Inequality Since 1700. Princeton, UNITED STATES: Princeton University Press, 2016. 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/londonschoolecons/detail.action?docID=4333586.  
46 Fourie, Johan, and Dieter von Fintel. ‘A History with Evidence: Income Inequality in the Dutch Cape Colony’. Economic History of Developing Regions 26, no. 1 (1 June 2011): 
16–48. https://doi.org/10.1080/20780389.2011.582990; Nunn, Nathan. ‘Slavery, Inequality, and Economic Development in the Americas’. Institutions and Economic 
Performance 15 (2008): 148–180. 
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Therefore, the evidence revised here shows that the persistence of economic institutions 
maintaining an unequal playing field arising from “extractive” colonialism has been largely 
overemphasized. The “institutional thesis” of ES and AJR only seems to apply to Brazil and 
South Africa. While in all the other former colonies, the persistence of “extractive” economic 
institutions is not sustained by comparative evidence as shown by market and wealth inequality 
levels which are similar to Western countries. Therefore, the mechanisms explaining inequality 
in Latin America and India remained to be explored.  
 
III.2 State capacity and Redistribution 
As argued for the remainder of this paper, what is salient about areas with high inequality such 
as Latin America, India and Africa is a weak state capacity that hinders the extent of 
redistribution through taxes and transfers.47 Following Besley and Persson (2011), state capacity 
should be understood as the ability of the state to extract substantial fiscal revenue – especially 
through direct taxation, and to mobilize such proceeds towards an efficient state action.48 State 
action is considered efficient when it chases public goals, and therefore, fiscal revenue is 
redistributed back to citizens through social benefits or invested in public goods – as opposed 
to being diverted or used for the protection of vested interests.49  
 
A weak extractive capacity limits the size and progressivity of taxes and transfers systems and 
therefore hinders the ability of the state to reduce inequality through redistribution as depicted 
in Figure 6. A low revenue collection (as % of GDP) notably constrains the size of social 
transfers which are essential to tackle inequality by lifting poorer households out of (relative and 
absolute) poverty,  thus impeding the redistributive capacity of states, – as in Latin America, 
India, and Africa.50 As shown by the OECD Global Revenue statistics database and the World 
Bank, India, Africa as well as Latin America have a relatively limited tax-to-GDP ratio. Standing 
 
47 Please see for instance on this Cárdenas, Mauricio. ‘State Capacity in Latin America’. Economía 10, no. 2 (2010): 
1–45; Odusola, Ayodele. ‘Fiscal Policy, Redistribution and Inequality in Africa’. Income Inequality Trends in Sub-
Saharan Africa: Divergence, Determinants and Consequences (2017), 2017. 
48 Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson. Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters. Princeton, 
UNITED STATES: Princeton University Press, 2011. 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/londonschoolecons/detail.action?docID=4001692.  
49 Acemoglu, Daron. ‘Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States’. Journal of Monetary Economics, Political 
economy and macroeconomics, 52, no. 7 (1 October 2005): 1199–1226. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.05.001.  
50Goni, Edwin Lopez, J. Humberto Serven, Luis. Fiscal Redistribution and Income Inequality In Latin America. 
Policy Research Working Papers. The World Bank, 2008. https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-4487;  Odusola, 
Ayodele. ‘Fiscal Policy, Redistribution and Inequality in Africa’. In Income Inequality Trends in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Divergence, Determinants and Consequences (2017), 2017. United Nations Development Programme; Lustig, Nora. 
‘Inequality and Fiscal Redistribution in Middle Income Countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru 
and South Africa’. Journal of Globalization and Development 7, no. 1 (2016): 17–60. 
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on average at 10%, 17% and 21% respectively. This compares to 32% on average in the OECD 
area.51 
 
At the same time, countries with a weak extractive capacity tend to overwhelmingly rely on 
regressive tax sources. This is partly because indirect taxation, that is trade and consumption 
taxes which are typically regressive i.e. falls more heavily in poor rather than rich households, 
often requires less administrative capacity than direct taxation, namely taxes on income and 
capital gains of individuals which have progressive components.52 Therefore, as shown in Figure 
6b, a weak extractive capacity breeds inequality as it hampers the redistributive impact of taxation 
through a regressive tax structure. This is notably the case in Latin America and Africa where 
indirect taxes (i.e. on consumption), which are typically regressive, account for roughly 50% of 
total taxation. While direct taxes (i.e. on income, profits and capital gains of individuals), which 
tend to have progressive components, represent only 9% and 15% of total taxes in Latin America 
and Africa respectively, compared to 25% in the OECD area and 38% in Western offshoots. As 
such, in Latin America as well as in Africa, the fiscal burden falls more heavily on poor rather 
than rich households, fuelling disposable income inequality.53 
 
51 Own calculations based on the OECD Global Revenue Statistics database. ‘Global Revenue Statistics Database - 
OECD’. Accessed 12 August 2020. https://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/global-revenue-statistics-database.htm; 
World Bank ‘Tax Revenue (% of GDP) - India | Data’. Accessed 13 August 2020. 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS?locations=IN.  
52 Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson. “Chapter 2 Fiscal Capacity” in Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of 
Development Clusters (2011).  
53 Namely because indirect taxes (on consumption) are typically regressive, i.e. have a greater incidence on poorer 
households, while taxes on income, profits and capital gains of individuals tend to be progressive. Especially given 
that poorer households consume a larger share of their income and therefore the incidence of consumption taxes is 
higher in these households, while taxes on income and capital gains tend to have more progressive components – 
notably because capital and income are concentrated at the top, and as such, its effects reduce inequality by having a 
lager incidence on richer households. 
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Figure 6. State Capacity and Redistribution 
Figure 6a: Extractive and Redistributive Capacity  
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Notes: The redistributive capacity is quantified by comparing inequality before and after taxes and transfers, with inequality bei ng measured by the Gini coefficient. That is to 
say, redistribution is the relative decline in market inequality after the effect of taxes and transfers. Here, East Asia corresponds to Japan and South Korea for which comparable 
data on redistribution is available. Latin America does not include the Caribbean –except for Dominican Republic for which data is available. Concerning the time period, the 
data on taxation (including the extractive capacity) corresponds to the average for 2010-2018 period, while the data on informality is for 2010-2015. The measures on social 
spending and redistribution are for circa 2016. Following the OECD methodology, here social expenditure comprises public transfers involving a redistribution of resources 
across households. Direct taxes correspond to taxes paid by individuals, including taxes on income, capital gains and profits , whereas indirect taxation corresponds to consumption 
and trade taxes.  
Sources: The data on taxation is based on the OECD Global Revenue Statistics database (accessed 12 October 2020).54 The measures of informality are based on IMF calculations 
as reported in Medina and Schneider (2018).55 The measures of social expenditure corresponds to OECD calculations based on ECLAC data (for non-OECD Latin American 
countries) and OECD statistics.56  
 
54 ‘Global Revenue Statistics Database - OECD’. Accessed 12 August 2020. https://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/global-revenue-statistics-database.htm.  
55 Medina, Leandro, and Friedrich Schneider. ‘Shadow Economies around the World: What Did We Learn over the Last 20 Years?’, 2018.  
56 Please see the data underlying Figure 4.4 in OECD (2019) Latin American Economic Outlook 2019. https://www.oecd.org/publications/latin-american-economic-outlook-
20725140.htm.  
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Concerning state intervention, when state intervention is inefficient, and therefore, not aligned 
with public goals and (or) unable to enforce law and taxation, fiscal policy may not be necessarily 
benefiting those in most need of economic support, therefore undermining the progressivity of 
fiscal policy, such as in Latin America.57 In this line, a large shadow economy, denoting the state 
incapacity to enforce law and taxation, hinders the ability of the state to tackle inequality through 
redistribution (as depicted in Figure 6b). Informality hampers redistribution because: (a) the 
coverage and progressivity of transfers are reduced as social benefits are typically conditional on 
participation in the formal economy while most poor households work in the informal sector 
and therefore have no access to income support such as to unemployment benefits,58 and (b) the 
informal sector, by not being taxed, diminishes fiscal revenue collection and therefore the 
capacity of the state to provide more generous social benefits.59 For instance, in Latin America, 
high informality has considerably aggravated the negative consequences of the Coronavirus 
pandemic on poorer households, as these informal workers have practically no access to social 
protection systems.60 According to ILO stats, in 2018, informal labour accounted for 45% of 
total employment in Brazil, 66% in Mexico and more than 80% in Central America, India and 
most of Africa.61  
 
Consequently, what is salient about Latin America and India, and explains its world-leading 
inequality levels, is an exceptionally limited state capacity to tackle market inequality through 
income redistribution. The latter is summarized in Figure 7, which shows that the fundamental 
determinant of extreme income inequality in most former “extractive” colonies are exceptionally 
low levels of redistribution (Figure 7b), and not the rather unexceptional degree of inequality of 
its economic playing field (Figure 7a). In fact, redistribution in Latin America is roughly 6 times 
lower than in the OECD area or Western Europe, while market inequality is roughly equivalent 
to other regions – as Figure 7 shows. Similarly, India is one of the most unequal places in the 
world (even more than Latin America) because it has an exceptionally weak redistribution, i.e. 2 
times lower than in Latin America, and more than 10 times lower than in the OECD area and 
Western Europe. Even Chile and Mexico, which are relatively prosperous (e.g. both are OECD 
 
57 Abad, Leticia Arroyo, and Peter H. Lindert. ‘Fiscal Redistribution in Latin America since the Nineteenth Century’. 
Bértola L, Williamson J, Organizadores. Has Latin American Inequality Changed Direction, 2017, 243–282; 
Cárdenas, Mauricio. ‘State Capacity in Latin America’. Economía 10, no. 2 (2010): 1–45. 
58 See: Skoufias, E., Lindert, K., & Shapiro, J. (2010). Globalization and the role of public transfers in redistributing 
income in Latin America and the Caribbean. World Development, 38(6), 895-907. 
59 See: Goñi, E., López, J. H., & Servén, L. (2008). Fiscal redistribution and income inequality in Latin America. 
60 Arnold, Jens, Paula Garda, and Alberto Gonzalez-Pandiella. ‘Reaching out to Informal Workers in Latin America: 
Lessons from COVID-19’, n.d., 6. https://oecdecoscope.blog/2020/06/29/reaching-out-to-informal-workers-in-
latin-america-lessons-from-covid-19/ 
61 ILOSTAT. ‘Informal Economy’. Accessed 12 August 2020. https://ilostat.ilo.org/topics/informality/.  
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members) vis à vis the average Latin America country and India, still have a very limited 
redistributive capacity which stand at around 6% Gini reduction, considerably lower than the 
average in the OECD area (33%), Eastern Europe (27%), North America (26%) and East-Asia 
(22%).62  
 
62 Here East Asia is Japan and South Korea, for which comparable data on redistribution is available.  
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Figure 7: What matters for determining income inequality difference across nations? 
The primacy of Redistributive Capacity over Economic Institutions  
 
Figure 7a: The extent of market inequality  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7b: The extent of redistribution  
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Figure 7c.  Income inequality [Disposable Income Gini = Market Gini * (1- Redistribution)] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Redistribution is quantified by comparing inequality before and after taxes and transfers, with inequality being measured by the Gini coefficient. That is to say, 
redistribution is the relative decline in market inequality after the effect of taxes and transfers. Therefore, by construction, Income inequality corresponds to Market Inequality 
multiplied by one minus the extend of redistribution i.e. Disposable Income Gini = Market Gini * (1- Redistribution). Besides, the results presented are not driven by any specific 
methodology or selection bias. The methodology of the LIS cross-national data centre – which along the OECD IDD are the main datasets on inequality, shows roughly the 
same results on inequality dynamics, i.e. the primacy of redistribution over market inequality on explaining income inequalit y across former colonies.63  
Sources: Own elaboration based on OECD and ECLAC calculations as explained in the “Mapping Inequality” section. As noted before, all these calculations are based on the 
OECD methodology.  
 
 
 
63 For instance, the LIS database also shows that former “extractive” colonies such as Egypt and Guatemala, which are not included in the OECD IDD nor in ECALC calculations, 
have lower market inequality levels than the US, France or the UK (and other Western European countries) and an exceptionally limited redistribution which explains its record-
high inequality levels. Please Caminada, Koen, Jinxian Wang, Kees Goudswaard, and Chen Wang. ‘Income Inequality and Fiscal Redistribution in 47 LIS-Countries, 1967-2014’. 
LIS Working Papers. LIS Working Papers. LIS Cross-National Data Center in Luxembourg, November 2017.  
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Only in very specific subset of countries, i.e. in South Africa and to a lower extent Brazil, asset and 
opportunities disparities are an important determinant of income inequality – as reflected in its 
high market inequality levels. Although, as in India or Latin America, market inequality translates 
into extreme income inequality levels as redistribution is not sufficiently high in these countries to 
contain its structural disparities. For instance, if Brazil had comparable levels of redistribution to 
the OECD area, as Romania has for instance, its income inequality levels would be 19 Gini points 
lower and comparable to the US.64   
 
To summarize the findings of the first part of this investigation, the “institutional thesis” and 
conventional wisdom have emphasized that inequality is fundamentally determined by economic 
institutions which maintain an exceptionally unequal distribution of asset and opportunities, thesis 
which is not sustained by comparative evidence. Instead, the evidence shows that what matter for 
explaining record-high income inequality in Latin America, Africa and India, are exceptionally 
limited levels of redistribution rooted in a weak extractive capacity benefiting richer households 
through a regressive fiscal policy.65 What are the historical causes of these patterns?  
 
 
IV.  The historical origins of comparative inequality levels 
IV.1 The origins of a regressive fiscal policy  
During the colonial period, in Latin America, Africa and India, as in most colonial settings, weak 
colonial administrations had to align its interests with local elites to maintain authority and be 
able to tax some revenue, and as such, implemented regressive fiscal systems (i.e. trade, 
consumption and flat rate taxes) which benefited these elites and minimized investment in state 
capacity.66 As noted by Gardner (2012), a regressive fiscal system was preferred by colonizers as 
it required less investments in administrative capacity, especially given the limited presence and 
capacity of these “skeletal” colonial administrations.67 For instance, in Spanish America, weak 
 
64 As disposable income inequality equals Market Gini * (1-Redistribution), then Income inequality in Brazil (with 
redistribution as Romania or the OECD area) = 0.58 * (1-0.33) = 0,39 equivalent to income inequality in the US.  
65 Here fiscal policy refers to the taxes-and-transfers schemes studied above.   
66 Frankema, Ewout. ‘Raising Revenue in the British Empire, 1870-1940: How Extractive Were Colonial Taxes?’ 
Journal of Global History, 2010, 447–477;  Frankema, Ewout, and Marlous van Waijenburg. ‘Metropolitan 
Blueprints of Colonial Taxation? Lessons from Fiscal Capacity Building in British and French Africa, c. 1880-1940’. 
The Journal of African History 55, no. 3 (2014): 371–400; Grafe, Regina, and Maria Alejandra Irigoin. ‘The Spanish 
Empire and Its Legacy: Fiscal Redistribution and Political Conflict in Colonial and Post-Colonial Spanish America’. 
Journal of Global History 1, no. 2 (2006): 241–267; Grafe, Regina, and Alejandra Irigoin. ‘A Stakeholder Empire: 
The Political Economy of Spanish Imperial Rule in America 1’. The Economic History Review 65, no. 2 (2012): 
609–651.  
67 “With little knowledge of the incomes of African taxpayers, colonial administrators had little choice but to impose flat rates. Colonial 
officials were aware that flat taxes were regressive, but assessing taxpayer incomes was well beyond the administrative capacity of the ‘thin 
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colonial administrations had to rely on local elites to control an enormously vast territory, and 
as such, these local elites (notably Spanish households and their descents) ended up controlling 
and benefiting from revenue collection and public expenditure decisions in exchange for their 
allegiance.68 The resulting regressive fiscal system reinforced inequality, as epitomized by the fact 
that direct taxes were targeted at the indigenous population, while Spanish households and their 
descents (i.e. the local elites) were not only exempted from direct taxation, but were also the 
main beneficiaries of public services – such as property rights.69 The same applies to Colonial 
Africa, where fiscal policy also benefited richer households as colonial administrations financed 
itself mostly through indirect taxation, and when existing, direct taxes typically had a flat rate 
(therefore regressive) and its collection relied on (and consequently benefited) local elites e.g. 
native chiefs.70  European settlers in Africa were also exempted from direct taxation, while 
natives had to pay in-kind tribute or work for the state, as under the corvée system.71 Similarly, the 
colonial administration in British India also had a very limited extractive capacity, and such, 
authorities aligned its interest with local elites and implemented a regressive fiscal system which 
relied on (and benefited) local elites and, as in the rest of colonial settings, fiscal policy increased 
inequality and reinforced local power structures – see Roy (2015).72 As noted by Gardner, even 
colonial authorities were aware that “this system of taxation was unfairly regressive and required the poorest 
taxpayers to fund the services provided to the wealthiest”.73 
 
 
 
white line’. Flat rate taxes were a compromise which allowed skeletal administrations to collect a direct tax at all” Please see 
Gardner, Leigh. Taxing Colonial Africa: The Political Economy of British Imperialism. Oxford University Press, 2012. 
68 Grafe, Regina, and Alejandra Irigoin. ‘A Stakeholder Empire: The Political Economy of Spanish Imperial Rule in 
America 1’. The Economic History Review 65, no. 2 (2012): 609–651; Grafe, Regina, and Maria Alejandra Irigoin. 
‘The Spanish Empire and Its Legacy: Fiscal Redistribution and Political Conflict in Colonial and Post-Colonial 
Spanish America’. Journal of Global History 1, no. 2 (2006): 241–267. 
69 Grafe, Regina, and Alejandra Irigoin. ‘A Stakeholder Empire: The Political Economy of Spanish Imperial Rule in 
America 1’. The Economic History Review 65, no. 2 (2012): 609–651; Grafe, Regina, and Maria Alejandra Irigoin. 
‘The Spanish Empire and Its Legacy: Fiscal Redistribution and Political Conflict in Colonial and Post-Colonial 
Spanish America’. Journal of Global History 1, no. 2 (2006): 241–267.  
70Frankema, Ewout, and Marlous van Waijenburg. ‘Metropolitan Blueprints of Colonial Taxation? Lessons from 
Fiscal Capacity Building in British and French Africa, c. 1880-1940’. The Journal of African History 55, no. 3 (2014): 
371–400; Piketty, Thomas. Capital and Ideology. Cambridge, UNITED STATES: Harvard University Press, 2020. 
Page 272.  
71 Gardner, Leigh Taxing Colonial Africa: The Political Economy of British Imperialism. Oxford University Press, 2012 
pages 51 to 53; Frankema, Ewout, and Marlous van Waijenburg. ‘Metropolitan Blueprints of Colonial Taxation? 
Lessons from Fiscal Capacity Building in British and French Africa, c. 1880-1940.  
72 Roy, Tirthankar. “Fiscal and Monetary Systems” in  The Economic History of India, 1857-1947. Oxford University 
Press. 2011. 
https://oxford.universitypressscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198074175.001.0001/acprof-
9780198074175-chapter-10.  
73 Gardner, Leigh Taxing Colonial Africa: The Political Economy of British Imperialism. Oxford University Press, 2012 
pages 51 to 53. 
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However, before the 20th century, a weak extractive capacity characterized by a regressive tax 
system and public spending benefiting the elite was the rule not only in places characterized by 
present-day high inequality levels such as Latin America, India or Africa, but also in Western 
Europe and most world regions. As shown by Piketty (2013), progressive taxation was virtually 
inexistent before the early 20th century, as tax systems in Europe and across the world relied on 
regressive sources i.e. consumption, trade and flat rate taxes.74 By the same token, Lindert (2004) 
has shown that redistributive spending emerged during the late 19th century in a few Western 
countries, but only became a non-marginal share of GDP during the 20th century.75 No different 
than in Colonial settings, for most of its history, Europeans states had a weak extractive capacity 
and therefore had to bargain with local elites to extract fiscal revenue and maintain authority, 
and as such, these elites ended up benefiting from tax and spending privileges, while poorer 
households had to assume the burden of taxation.76 In this line, the work of Alfani et al (2016, 
2019), has shown how a regressive fiscal burden in Western Europe is fundamental to 
understand high inequality levels in these pre-modern societies.77 Similarly, before the late 19th 
century, in North America, no different than in southern Latin American neighbours, also had 
a central tax system which benefited richer households as it overwhelmingly relied on regressive 
revenue sources, i.e. consumption and trade taxes.78  
 
The literature, e.g. Acemoglu et al (2005, 2011), has also stressed the collapse of the Old Regime 
in Western Europe as a milestone on the path towards less institutionalized inequality.79 
However, the different revolutions which occurred before the 20 th century did not put an end to 
this regressive equilibrium as the new ruling elites where the main beneficiaries. The emergent 
 
74 Piketty, Thomas, and Arthur Goldhammer. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, UNITED STATES: 
Harvard University Press, 2013. Pages 637 -653 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/londonschoolecons/detail.action?docID=3301398 
75Lindert, Peter H., ed. ‘Explaining the Rise of Social Transfers Since 1880’. In Growing Public: Social Spending and 
Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Century: Volume 1: The Story, 1:171–90. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510717.008. 
76 Dincecco, Mark. ‘The Rise of Effective States in Europe’. The Journal of Economic History 75, no. 3 (2015): 
901–918; Alfani, Guido, and Matteo Di Tullio. The Lion’s Share: Inequality and the Rise of the Fiscal State in 
Preindustrial Europe. Cambridge University Press, 2019. Page 163; Alfani, Guido, and Wouter Ryckbosch. ‘Growing 
Apart in Early Modern Europe? A Comparison of Inequality Trends in Italy and the Low Countries, 1500–1800’. 
Explorations in Economic History 62 (1 October 2016): 143–53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eeh.2016.07.003. 
77 Alfani, Guido, and Matteo Di Tullio. The Lion’s Share: Inequality and the Rise of the Fiscal State in Preindustrial 
Europe. Cambridge University Press, 2019. Page 163; Alfani, Guido, and Wouter Ryckbosch. ‘Growing Apart in 
Early Modern Europe? A Comparison of Inequality Trends in Italy and the Low Countries, 1500–1800’. 
Explorations in Economic History 62 (1 October 2016): 143–53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eeh.2016.07.003.  
78 Sokoloff, Kenneth L., and Eric M. Zolt. ‘Inequality and the Evolution of Institutions of Taxation: Evidence from 
the Economic History of the Americas’. 2007.  
79 Acemoglu, Daron, Davide Cantoni, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. ‘The Consequences of Radical 
Reform: The French Revolution’. American Economic Review 101, no. 7 (2011): 3286–3307;  Acemoglu, Daron, 
Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. ‘The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic 
Growth’. American Economic Review 95, no. 3 (2005): 546–579. 
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elite democracies (i.e. democratic systems excluding average and poor households from politics) 
in post-revolutionary UK and France, as well as in post-independence Latin America, all decided 
to maintain a regressive fiscal system.80 For instance, the Glorious Revolution in England led the 
emergence of an elite democracy where a coalition of wealth-holders ended up having direct 
control (as opposed to bargaining power beforehand) over public expenditure decisions. 81 
However, this political power was not used to increase the progressivity of fiscal policy, but to 
channel public expenditure towards the protection and expansion of the business interests of 
these wealth-holders.82 Not surprisingly, this exclusionary democracy did not promote equality. 
In Britain, since the 1780s until the early 20th century, the richest 10% concentrated 90% of total 
wealth, while the bottom 50% owned around 1% of total wealth.83 The political effects of the 
French Revolution were no different than in Britain, the resulting bourgeois democracy maintained 
a regressive fiscal system, which played a fundamental role in explaining the failure of the French 
Revolution to deliver equality.84 Exclusionary democracies (as well as non-democracies) in 
Europe and North America during the 19th century also had no interest in tackling inequality.85 
Similarly, elite democracies in nineteenth-century Latin America maintained a regressive fiscal 
policy inherited from colonialism.86  
 
All these different political settings have in common coalitions of wealth holders that control 
fiscal policy, either directly through political institutions, as in elite democracies , or indirectly 
through bargaining power in colonial and non-democratic settings. Whereas poor and average 
households had virtually no say in revenue collection and expenditure decisions. Therefore, 
before the 20th century, fiscal policy was designed to extract resources from the politically-
 
80 The concept of elite democracies comes from Lindert (2004). Please see Lindert, Peter H., ed. ‘Explaining the 
Rise of Social Transfers Since 1880’.  
81 Jha, Saumitra. ‘Financial Asset Holdings and Political Attitudes: Evidence from Revolutionary England’. SSRN 
Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 13 March 2015. 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.934943.  
82 After the Glorious revolution public revenue was heavily invested in a type of overseas expansion which was 
aligned with the interests of (and there profited) wealth holders i.e. merchants. Please see Jha, Saumitra. ‘Financial 
Asset Holdings and Political Attitudes..  
83The data corresponds to net wealth, including both financial and non-financial assets. Please see “Figure 5.4. The 
concentration of property in Britain, 1780-2015”.  (Piketty, 2020). 
http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/ideology/pdf/F5.4.pdf 
84 Piketty, Thomas. Chapter 4 in Capital and Ideology. Cambridge, UNITED STATES: Harvard University Press, 
2020. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/londonschoolecons/detail.action?docID=6028824.  
85Please see Figure 10.6. Wealth inequality in Europe versus the United States, 1810–2010 (Piketty, 2013). 
http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/capital21c/en/pdf/F10.6.pdf  
86 Irigoin, Alejandra. ‘Representation Without Taxation, Taxation Without Consent: The Legacy of Spanish 
Colonialism in America’. Revista de Historia Económica; Montevideo 34, no. 2 (September 2016): 169–208. 
http://dx.doi.org.gate3.library.lse.ac.uk/10.1017/S0212610916000069.  
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excluded non-elite households (through regressive taxation) to provide public services benefiting 
an elite of asset holders, such as protection of ownership rights.87 
 
IV.2 The consequences of a regressive equilibrium  
Consistent with the evidence revised above (that all these settings shared a political equilibrium 
which excluded non-elite households and an inequality-enhancing fiscal policy) the historical 
evidence shows that Western Europe and North America had extremely high inequality levels 
before the 20th century, inequality which was no different (and even higher in most cases) than 
in Latin America, India or Africa. The later evidence is presented below in Figure 8, which was 
constructed based on the methodology and criteria to estimate historical inequality explained at 
the beginning of this paper.  
 
As shown in Figure 8a, income inequality levels in pre-modern Western Europe were extremely 
high – more pronounced than in colonized parts of India, the southern parts of colonial US 
(where slavery was widespread) and even higher than in present-day Brazil or India. The US also 
shows high inequality at the eve of independence, inequality was higher than in Bihar (colonial 
India) and comparable to modern-day Latin America, 0.44 and 0.46 Gini respectively. While 
there are no reliable historical records to compute inequality measures for colonial Latin 
America,88 the available evidence indicates that inequality was probably not especially high given 
the limited extent of slavery (except in Brazil) and that real wages where well above subsistence 
and comparable to European levels.89 Consistent with the latter, Figure 8b shows that during the 
late 19th century (when data on inequality is more abundant), Peru, Chile and even Brazil had 
lower inequality levels than the US and Western countries – which following AJR and ES 
supposedly had more “inclusive” economic institutions.  Again, the only exceptions are places 
which experienced widespread slavery such as colonial Haiti and South Africa (Cape colony), 
which show record-high inequality levels since colonial times. However, Figure 8 indicates that 
the rest of supposedly “extractive” colonies, for which data on historical inequality is available, 
 
87 For instance, Piketty called the period between the Old Regime and the rise of the Welfare state during the early 
20th century, the hegemony of the inegalitarians “Ownership societies” during the 18th and 19th century. Please see 
Piketty, Thomas “chapter 3 Invention of Owner­ship Societies” in. Capital and Ideology. Cambridge, US. Harvard 
University Press, 2020. 
88 Please see Appendix B. 
89 Arroyo Abad, Leticia, Elwyn Davies, and Jan Luiten van Zanden. ‘Between Conquest and Independence: Real 
Wages and Demographic Change in Spanish America, 1530–1820’. Explorations in Economic History 49, no. 2 (1 
April 2012): 149–66; Williamson, Jeffrey G. ‘Five Centuries of Latin American Inequality’. Working Paper. Working 
Paper Series. National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2009. https://doi.org/10.3386/w15305.  
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did not have comparatively high inequality levels at least until the late 19th century. This includes 
Peru, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Kenya and India. 
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Figure 8a. Income inequality during colonial rule, circa 1770-1800 
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Figure 8b. Income inequality during the late 19th century, circa 1860-70s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The data is organized from the highest to the lowest Gini coefficient. “No data” means that there are no historical records to construct inequality measures, such as for 
colonial Latin America or Brazil. In the case of colonial Haiti and Cape Colony, there are historical records documenting income differences, but the inequality estimates for the 
Gini coefficient and the top 10% income (respectively) have not been calculated. Concerning slavery in Figure 8b, Brazil had 15% of slaves in 1870, while in the US South 46% of 
its population was under slavery in 1860.  
Source: Own elaboration based on historical inequality estimates following Milanovic et al Methodology and based on the criteria developed in the “Mapping Inequality” section. 
The specific sources of each inequality estimate used can be found in Appendix A, as well as the specific dates of each estimation based on its respective historical record. 
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Therefore, consistent with our analysis of modern distributive statistics analysed at the beginning 
of this paper, the available evidence on historical inequality also refutes the historical narrative 
and institutional thesis of ES and AJR. The historical inequality estimates (shown above) do not 
support the early (or colonial origins) of comparative inequality differences, i.e. places which 
have extreme inequality levels today (Latin America and India) show lower historical inequality 
than places which are relatively equal today (Western Europe). All this evidence suggests that 
the historical origins of inequality differences do not arise from supposedly divergent economic 
institutions related to colonialism. Instead, it seems that the origins of comparative inequality 
levels are to be found in the 20th century and has to do with divergent fiscal policy and political 
(not economic) institutions. 
 
IV.3 The Great Divergence on regional inequality trajectories during the 20th century. 
As explained by Lindert (2004) and Piketty (2013), it was not until the early 20 th century that, 
exceptionally in some Western societies, fiscal policy became progressive as redistribution 
developed following an unprecedented democratization process, i.e. the inauguration of mass 
political participation (especially of poorer households) and open electoral competition.90 Since 
the early 20th century and for the first time in history, by being de facto represented in politics, 
average and poor households had a say on expenditure and revenue collection decisions, which 
eventually led to a fiscal policy which promoted redistribution –  as opposed to inequality 
beforehand.91 As shown below in Figure 9, the emergence of a redistributive fiscal policy in 
western countries led to an unprecedented and persistent reduction on income inequality during 
the 20th century and notably since the 1930s, referred to as the “Great Levelling”  – namely, the 
emergence of substantial progressive taxation and spending policies benefiting poorer 
households.92 At the opposite end, despite similar levels of inequality before and during the First 
 
90 Lindert, Peter H. Growing Public: Volume 1, the Story: Social Spending and Economic Growth since the 
Eighteenth Century. Vol. 1. Cambridge University Press, 2004; Piketty, Thomas, and Arthur Goldhammer. Capital 
in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, UNITED STATES: Harvard University Press, 2013. Pages 601-608 and 
637 -653. 
91 Lindert, Peter H., ed. ‘Explaining the Rise of Social Transfers Since 1880’. In Growing Public: Social Spending 
and Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Century: Volume 1: The Story, 1:171–90. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510717.008; Piketty, Thomas, and Arthur 
Goldhammer. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, UNITED STATES: Harvard University Press, 2013. 
Pages 637 -653  
92 Concerning the “persistency” of the reduction, despite the well-known fact that income inequality has increased in 
Western societies since the 1980s, income inequality in Western Europe and the US is very far from the extreme 
inequality levels reached during the Belle Époque (1870-1920s). At the same time, the work of Piketty et al. which 
have famously stressed rising inequality is based on pre-tax inequality dynamics, and therefore, the rise in inequality 
observed in their data since the 1980s is overestimated as they do not account for redistributive dynamics. For instance, 
the inequality rise led by the emergence of the so-called “working rich” (i.e. the new managerial classes receiving top 
salaries) has been relatively contained by a robust redistributive capacity in Western Europe and in the OECD area – 
notably through direct taxation which checks rising pre-tax wage disparities. For a comprehensive analysis on the 
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Globalization, income inequality has remained comparably high in Latin America, Africa and 
India all through the 20th century until today.93 The latter, as we have seen, is explained by a weak 
state capacity and a regressive fiscal policy which has not been fully addressed until today. 
 
 
current rise in inequality and the fundamental role played by redistribution in OECD countries please see Causa, 
Orsetta, and Mikkel Nørlem Hermansen. ‘Income Redistribution through Taxes and Transfers across OECD 
Countries’. 2018.  
93This historical evolution of inequality dynamics and timing, shown in Figure 9, is consistent with other estimations 
e.g. Prados de la Escosura et al (2007) and Williamson (2015). Please see Escosura, Leandro Prados de la, Timothy J. 
Hatton, Kevin H. O’Rourke, and Alan M. Taylor. “Inequality and Poverty in Latin America: A Long-Run Exploration 
“’. in  Hatton, Timothy; Kevin ORourke; Alan Taylor (Hg.): The New Comparative Economic History. Essays in 
Honor of Jeffrey G. Williamson. Cambridge Mas. & London, 2007, 291–315; Williamson, Jeffrey G. ‘Latin American 
Inequality: Colonial Origins, Commodity Booms or a Missed Twentieth-Century Leveling?’ Journal of Human 
Development and Capabilities 16, no. 3 (3 July 2015): 324–41. https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2015.1044821.  
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Figure 9. The “Great Divergence” on inequality during the 20th century 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: These measures correspond to the regional average of the estimates on income inequality for each country during the period studied. These inequality estimates correspond 
to the best available evidence on historical inequality dynamics during the 20 th century. Most of the measures are historical reconstructions based on a wide range of historical 
records documenting within-countries income differences, including social tables, heights, real wages, factor prices among other pieces of evidence. As noted before, Western 
Offshoots include the US, Canada, New Zealand and Australia.  
Sources: The figure is my own based on the regional Gini estimates from Moatsos, Michail, Joerg Baten, Peter Foldvari, Bas van Leeuwen, and Jan Luiten van Zanden. ‘Income 
Inequality since 1820’, in How Was Life?: Global Well-being since 1820, OECD Publishing, Paris. 2 October 2014, 199–215 https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264214262-15-en. 
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Other well-known factors affected worldwide inequality dynamics during the 20th century, 
although its impact does not explain the “Great Divergence” in long-term inequality trends – 
namely because these were global shocks and not country-specific. These factors are: (I) a 
transport revolution (e.g. steamships, trains and canals) which triggered the First Globalization 
since the 1870s and led to increasing inequality (related to the expansion of international trade 
and finance) across all regions;94 and (II) its subsequent boost during the Great Depression and 
World War II, which eroded wealth value (due to inflation and capital destruction) and limited 
international trade and finance – due to war disruptions (see for instance Piketty, 2013).95 
However, as Figure 9 shows, these shocks affected all regions in an already largely globalized 
and interdependent world since the late 19th century, and therefore, does not explain the 
persistent “Great Divergence” in inequality across regions, as the latter is explained by 
redistributive dynamics. De facto, when the global disruptions (to international trade and finance) 
maintaining worldwide inequality subdued dissipated during the post-war period, inequality 
increased again in Latin America and Africa, whereas a robust redistributive capacity maintained 
inequality (relatively) under check in Western countries. 
 
In this line, Williamson (2015, 2019) has argued that, consistent with the evidence revised here, 
that North America (as well as Western Europe) only became less unequal than Latin America 
during the 20th century – as the latter missed the “Greatest Levelling” which took place in 
Western Nations.96 However, Williamson has not explained why Latin America missed the 
“Great Levelling” nor what did the region miss. Has Latin America missed the emergence of 
“inclusive” economic institutions (as suggested by AJR) or the formation of redistributive 
capacity? As we have shown through this paper, the fundamental divergence is on redistribution 
and state capacity, not on the degree of “inclusiveness” of economic intuitions – which is similar 
in Western countries and Latin America. Therefore, the fundamental question is: why a 
regressive fiscal policy which breeds inequality was not reformed in Latin America, India or 
Africa? 
 
94 On the first Globalization and the transport revolution please see O’Rourke, K. and J. Williamson (1999). 
“Transport Revolutions and Commodity Market Integrations”, Chapter 3 in Globalization and History: The Evolution of 
a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy. MIT press, 1999. 
95 Concerning the connection between inequality and globalization, the analysis of these mechanisms is beyond the 
scope of this investigation. For a comprehensive review on this subject please see for instance Kanbur, Ravi. ‘Chapter 
20 - Globalization and Inequality’. In Handbook of Income Distribution, edited by Anthony B. Atkinson and François 
Bourguignon, 2:1845–81. Handbook of Income Distribution. Elsevier, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-
59429-7.00021-2.  
96 Williamson, Jeffrey G. ‘Latin American Inequality: Colonial Origins, Commodity Booms or a Missed Twentieth-
Century Leveling?’ Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 16, no. 3 (2015): 324–341; LINDERT, PETER 
H., and JEFFREY G. WILLIAMSON. ‘The Greatest Leveling of All Time’. In Unequal Gains, 194–218. American 
Growth and Inequality since 1700. Princeton University Press, 2016. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvc77j93.12.  
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V. Explaining the Great Divergence 
V.1 The Political Economy of Redistribution 
In the rest of this investigation, we will try to shed some lights on the importance of 
democratisation and redistribution on explaining the Great Divergence in inequality during the 
20th century. The hypothesis of this research is that limited de facto political voice of poor and 
average households (related to a not-so-democratic 20th century) in India, Latin America and 
Africa undermined the formation of the state capacity and the political support required to levy 
substantial progressive taxation and to channel these resources towards social protection 
schemes. Why? 
 
The empirical and theoretical literature on the political economy of fiscal policy suggests that 
only full democratization (i.e. the incorporation of average and poor households into politics) 
leads to substantial redistribution, i.e. sizable and progressive taxation and social transfers.  
Concerning the political economy of the process, Meltzer and Richard (1981) have famously 
argued that an enlargement of the franchise should lead to a more progressive fiscal policy, 
namely because incorporating poorer households into politics change the position of the decisive 
political actor in the income distribution.97 However, this does not mean that democracy per se 
leads to higher redistribution. Namely, because the likelihood to implementing progressive 
taxation is only higher in full democracies, i.e. when the franchise is closer to universal suffrage 
and there is uncontrolled electoral competition, and therefore, poor and average households 
have de facto access to a political voice.98 Whereas elite democracies (which exclude non-elite 
households through wealth or literacy requirements), are more likely to implement regressive 
taxes benefiting richer households – as explored above in the case of 19th century UK or France.99  
 
97 Meltzer, Allan H., and Scott F. Richard. ‘A Rational Theory of the Size of Government’. Journal of Political 
Economy 89, no. 5 (1981): 914–927; Lindert, Peter H., ed. ‘Explaining the Rise of Social Transfers Since 1880’. In 
Growing Public: Social Spending and Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Century: Volume 1: The Story, 
1:171–90. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510717.008.  
98 As argued by Sokoloff and Zolt (2007) based on comparative evidence on suffrage and taxation systems in the 
Americas during the 19th and 20th century, focusing on the different experiences between Latin and North America. 
By the same token, Aidt et al (2009), following a quantitative approach applied to OECD countries since the 19th 
century, has shown that progressive taxes are more likely to emerge in places which achieved (or got closer) to full 
democracies, while a democratization process which excludes poorer households may even increase indirect taxation 
as in elite democracies in Europe during the 19th century. Please see Aidt, Toke S., and Peter S. Jensen. ‘The Taxman 
Tools up: An Event History Study of the Introduction of the Personal Income Tax’. Journal of Public Economics 93, 
no. 1 (1 February 2009): 160–75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.07.006; Sokoloff, Kenneth L., and Eric M. 
Zolt. ‘Inequality and the Evolution of Institutions of Taxation: Evidence from the Economic History of the Americas’. 
In The Decline of Latin American Economies: Growth, Institutions, and Crises, 83–138. University of Chicago Press, 2007.  
99 Elite democracies, as in 19th century Europe and Latin America, are aligned with the interests of richer 
households (which have access to political representation) and therefore prefer a regressive fiscal policy.  
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Concerning redistribution through social transfers, increased de facto political voice of poorer 
households (i.e. broader political participation and electoral competition), does not only lead to 
progressive revenue collection but also to more progressive expenditure. As shown by Lindert 
(2004), the incorporation of non-elite households was a necessary condition for the emergence 
of substantial redistributive public spending, namely because poorer households have a strong 
interest in using their political voice to channel public resources towards social benefits.100  
 
Democratization also helps to build a solid “fiscal contract” i.e. when citizens trust the state and 
therefore are more willing to pay taxes. In a full democracy, checks and balances on the executive 
(notably on expenditure decisions) lead to a state intervention which chases public goals , and 
therefore, permits the formation of credible commitments which increase the extractive capacity of 
the state.101 Namely because, citizens are more willing to pay taxes if the state is under the 
“control” of society, and therefore, committed to redistribute back to citizens a substantial part of 
these resources through social benefits or public goods, as opposed to use these resources for 
the protection of vested interests. For instance, the work of the OECD shows that a citizens-
centred public spending solidifies the “fiscal contract”, and as such, reduces informality and 
increase revenue collection, whereas widespread corruption (reflecting weak checks on 
expenditure) erodes tax compliance.102 Therefore, a solid fiscal contract (arising from 
democratization) increase redistribution by increasing revenue collection (related to higher 
compliance), which increments the redistributive capacity of the state, i.e. the state is capable to 
provide more generous social benefits; on the top of reducing informality, and therefore, 
increasing access to social security. 
 
V.2 Research Strategy  
To the best of our knowledge, the literature has not empirically tested the impact of 
democratization on redistribution per se (as opposed to imperfect measures such as direct 
taxation or social transfers), nor has differentiated the impact of a history of democratic 
institutions on market inequality (reflecting economic institutions) from redistribution (reflecting 
 
100 Lindert, Peter H., ed. ‘Explaining the Rise of Social Transfers Since 1880’. In Growing Public: Social Spending 
and Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Century: Volume 1: The Story, 1:171–90. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510717.008.  
101 Dincecco, Mark. ‘The Rise of Effective States in Europe’. The Journal of Economic History 75, no. 3 (2015): 
901–918; Acemoglu, Daron. ‘Politics and Economics in Weak and Strong States’. Journal of Monetary Economics, 
Political economy and macroeconomics, 52, no. 7 (1 October 2005): 1199–1226. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.05.001.  
102 OECD (2019), Tax Morale: What Drives People and Businesses to Pay Tax?, OECD Publishing, Paris, 
https://doi.org/10.1787/f3d8ea10-en; OECD (2018). ‘The Social Contract in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Situation and Policy Challenges’, 9 April 2018, 43–87. https://doi.org/10.1787/leo-2018-6-en.  
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state capacity).103 Moreover, as noted by Acemoglu et al (2015), the literature studying the effects 
of democratization on redistribution (using imperfect measures) has not developed rigorous 
econometric research, notably because they have not accounted for the endogeneity of political 
institutions.104 Therefore, causal interpretations of the findings of this literature are difficult.  
 
As such, the novel identification strategy of this investigation aims to identify the causal impact 
of a history of democracy during the 20th century on current inequality and redistributive 
dynamics. To do so, we will follow an Instrumental Variable (IV) strategy to address the 
endogeneity of political institutions. Building on AJR (2001),  this research exploits historical 
European mortality rates as an instrument for the “inclusiveness” of the political system (i.e. the 
degree of political inequality) as done in the literature - see for instance AJR (2002, 2005) and 
Rodrick et al (2004).105 The underlying assumption, that we share with AJR, is that in areas with 
lower European mortality rates, Europeans settled in larger numbers during colonization, which 
eventually led to an history of more “inclusive” political institutions –  as shown latter in Figure 
10a.106  
 
However, while the research of AJR focuses on access to secure property rights (during the late 
20th century) and its impact on economic development, this investigation focuses on analysing 
the impact of a history of democratic institutions (during the 20 th century) on inequality and 
redistributive dynamics. The only thing in common of this research strategy and AJR, is the IV 
approach based on settler mortality. However, we do not even use the same data to construct 
our instrument. Namely because, Acemoglu et al. data present potential measurement error as 
these authors had to extrapolate (based on assumptions) some mortality rates to address the lack 
of evidence on historical European mortality rates across all colonized countries.107 This research 
uses instead a revised version of AJR (2001) settler mortality data developed by Albouy (2012), 
who revised some estimates made by AJR based on within-country evidence on historical settler 
 
103 For a comprehensive review of the literature please see Acemoglu, Daron, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and 
James A. Robinson. ‘Chapter 21 - Democracy, Redistribution, and Inequality’. In Handbook of Income 
Distribution, edited by Anthony B. Atkinson and François Bourguignon, 2:1885–1966. Handbook of Income 
Distribution. Elsevier, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-444-59429-7.00022-4.  
104 Idem. 
105 Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi. ‘Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over 
Geography and Integration in Economic Development’. Journal of Economic Growth 9, no. 2 (2004): 131–165.  
106 Namely because colonizers typically guaranteed equal political rights to other colonizers, therefore places with more 
European settlers (i.e. more colonizers vis à vis indigenous population) ended up having less political inequality. This 
early emergence of less political inequality facilitated the formation of more democratic institutions after independence 
as we will see in Figure 10a. 
107 Albouy, David Y. ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Comment’. 
American Economic Review 102, no. 6 (1 October 2012): 3059–76. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.6.3059.  
40 
 
mortality rates.108 Therefore, we used Albouy data as it is closer to capture the historical variation 
on mortality rates across territories, and as such, this revised dataset minimizes measurement 
error and potential sources of bias. In any case, the findings of this research are robust to using 
the original AJR data - please see Appendix B. 
 
V.3 Building the IV model 
To measure the degree of access to political voice during the 20th century we construct two 
variables to quantify a history of democratic institutions. These measures correspond to the 
average value (during the period studied) of two widely used measures of democratic institutions: 
the Polity2 index (from the Polity IV database) and Vanhanen´s Index of Democracy (from the 
Polyarchy dataset). The Polity2 index captures checks on the executive as well as political 
competitiveness and openness, ranging from -10 (“Full Autocracy”) to +10 (“Full 
Democracy”).109 Respectively, the Index of Democracy is constructed using electoral data on 
political participation (i.e. the percentage of adults who votes) and electoral competition (i.e. the 
share of votes going to the winning party).110 As shown by Vanhanen, accounting for both 
political participation and competition, as the Polity2 and the Index of Democracy does, is 
fundamental to capture de facto access to political voice in a democratic system – as the 
distribution of real political power requires both mass participation and open competition.111 For 
example, present-day Venezuela and Cuba hold elections with mass political participation, 
however, there is no real political competition i.e. the official party capture the majority of the 
votes, therefore political voice is de facto limited. A such, the two chosen measures of a history 
of democracy capture both openness and participation to account for de facto access to political 
voice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 Idem.  
109 ‘PolityProject’. Accessed 26 June 2020. https://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html.  
110 Oslo (PRIO), Peace Pesearch Institute. ‘The Polyarchy Dataset - PRIO’. Accessed 26 June 2020. 
https://www.prio.org/Data/Governance/Vanhanens-index-of-democracy/.  
111Vanhanen, Tatu. ‘A New Dataset for Measuring Democracy, 1810-1998’. Journal of Peace Research 37, no. 2 (2000): 
251–265.   
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Figure 10: Settler Mortality, Democratic History and Comparative Inequality levels 
Figure 10a. Historical Settler Mortality and Democratic History  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10b. Historical Settler Mortality and Income Inequality  
 
Consistent with the macro-narrative of AJR, Figure 10b shows that historical settler mortality 
not only leads to divergent democratization processes, but also to different inequality levels 
between former settler colonies (i.e. western offshoots) and non-settler colonies i.e. Latin 
America and India. However, Figure 11 presented below strongly suggests that the latter is 
fundamentally explained by divergent levels of redistributive capacity (Figure 11a) as our 
hypothesis suggest, and not by differences in the extent of “institutionalized” inequality of the 
economic playing field (Figure 11b) – as suggested by AJR, ES and conventional wisdom. Figure 
11b depicts an (apparent) absolute lack of relationship between market inequality and different 
types of colonization (“settler” or not) which is consistent with the evidence revised in section 
II, further reinforcing the imperative to study redistributive dynamics instead of supposedly 
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divergent economic institutions. The econometrical analysis that we will develop next will allow 
us to confirm, by arguably establishing causality through the IV approach, that different 
democratization processes during the 20th century explain these divergent redistributive 
capacities, and therefore, the comparative inequality levels observed in Figure 10b. 
 
Figure 11: The Fiscal Origins of Comparative Inequality Differences 
Figure 11a. Settler Mortality and Redistribution  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.b Settler Mortality and Market Inequality  
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For establishing causality, the literature stipulates that it is fundamental to consider a set of 
relevant control variables in our IV estimations, including geography, climate as well as political 
and institutional development before colonization.  First, the historical evidence shows that 
colonial administrations build on of pre-colonization institutions (i.e. social, labour and tributary 
systems) to develop their extractive and administrative capacity, and as such, indigenous 
development largely influenced subsequent institutional and state capacity development across 
colonized territories.112 Therefore, based on the data from AJR (2002), the IV estimations 
controls for native population density (pre-European conquest circa 1500), which accounts for 
economic development before colonization and the relative abundance of native labour. As a 
further robustness check, our IV estimates also control for the presence and complexity of native 
forms of government based on the “State History” Index developed by Borcan et al (2018), 
which permits us to control for accumulated human capital and sate capacity before European 
colonization i.e. by circa 1500.113 Incorporating the State History index notably permits to take 
into consideration the large differences in pre-colonization administrative capacity, i.e. between 
places which developed strong states such as the Inca Empire or Moghul India, which provided 
public goods and levied tribute, and areas where forms of government rarely surpassed the tribal 
level as in North America. Secondly, following McArthur and Sachs (2001), we also incorporate 
geography and climate to our controls as accounting for these factors is fundamental to achieve 
causal estimations and notably so when using settler mortality as IV.  114 Namely because mortality 
rates are typically higher in warmer areas and in places closer to the equator, and therefore, not 
accounting for these variables could produce bias – as historical settler mortality rates would 
correlate with the omitted variables (geography and climate), which may themselves have an 
impact on the outcome variables.  
 
Concerning the validity of the instrumental variable (IV), as depicted in Table I, historical settler 
mortality is a strong and relevant determinant of democratic political institutions during the 20th 
century. The explanatory power of the IV remains robust once we account for all the relevant 
controls discussed above, which validate the choice of our instrument. Concerning the exclusion 
 
112 Frankema, Ewout, and Marlous van Waijenburg. ‘Metropolitan Blueprints of Colonial Taxation? Lessons from 
Fiscal Capacity Building in British and French Africa, c. 1880-1940’. The Journal of African History 55, no. 3 (2014): 
371–400; Arias, Luz Marina, and Desha M. Dirod. ‘Indigenous Origins of Colonial Institutions’. Quarterly Journal 
of Political Science 9, no. 3 (18 September 2014): 371–406. https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00013135.  
113 Borcan, O., Olsson, O. and Putterman, L. (2018) "State History and Economic Development: Evidence from Six 
Millennia" Journal of Economic Growth 23(1): 1-40. https://sites.google.com/site/econolaols/extended-state-
history-index   
114 McArthur, John W., and Jeffrey D. Sachs. ‘Institutions and Geography: Comment on Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2000)’. National bureau of economic research, 2001.  
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restriction of the IV, based on the literature, once we control for geography, climate and political 
and economic development before colonization, there are no reasons to believe that historical 
settler mortality affects our outcome variables through other channels than political 
institutions.115 Besides, the results of the relevant econometrical tests such as for 
underidentification and overidentification, which are all available in Appendix B, confirm that 
our identification strategy is correct.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
115 McArthur, John W., and Jeffrey D. Sachs. ‘Institutions and Geography: Comment on Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2000)’. National bureau of economic research, 2001; Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A 
Robinson. ‘Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income 
Distribution’. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, n.d., 64, 2002. 
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Table I. Historical Settler Mortality and Democratic Institution 
Table Ia. Dependent= Vanhanen 
Index of Democracy 1900-2000 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Settler Mortality Revised -4.236*** -3.634** -2.886* -6.639** 
 (0.689) (1.234) (1.164) (1.797) 
     
Geography &  
Climate controls 
no yes yes yes 
     
Indigenous Population    -1.531** -1.300 
Density by 1500   (0.554) (0.894) 
     
Native State History     -0.0335 
by 1500    (0.270) 
     
_cons 26.29*** 22.39* 14.45 22.94* 
 (3.100) (8.483) (8.292) (10.95) 
N 51 40 40 30 
adj. R2 0.424 0.373 0.473 0.551 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Table Ib. Dependent = 
Polity2 index 1900-2000 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Settler Mortality Revised -2.682*** -3.213** -2.770** -3.423** 
 (0.475) (0.924) (0.907) (1.033) 
     
Geography &  
Climate controls 
no yes yes yes 
     
Indigenous Population    -0.907* -0.0577 
Density by 1500   (0.432) (0.788) 
     
Native State History     -9.259 
by 1500    (7.217) 
     
_cons 12.97*** 17.86** 13.16* 14.63* 
 (2.131) (6.351) (6.464) (6.506) 
N 49 40 40 40 
adj. R2 0.392 0.361 0.418 0.428 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Notes: The “Geography & Climate controls” include Sea Exposure (i.e. the amount of the territory within 100 km 
of the sea), Absolute Latitude (i.e. distance from the equator, normalized between 0 and 1), and Mean Temperature.  
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V.4. Main Results and Interpretations 
The results of the IV regressions presented in Table II show that, in line with the argument 
developed in this investigation, there is a strong and significant relationship between a history 
of democratic institutions an inequality reduction through taxes and transfers (as shown in Table 
2a), while there is not a significant connection between democratic institutions and a more level 
economic playing field (as depicted in Table 2b). The sample of 24 countries used for the IV 
estimations includes all former colonies for which comparable and reliable data on redistribution 
and inequality is available – as developed in Section II of this paper.    
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Table II. IV Results: The Fiscal Origins of Comparative Inequality levels 
Table IIa: History of Democracy, Redistribution and Sate Capacity 
Reg (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Redistribution 
 
Direct Taxes 
 (% of GDP) 
Ratio Direct/ 
Indirect Taxes 
Redistribution Direct Taxes 
(% of GDP) 
Ratio Direct/ 
Indirect Taxes 
Index of Democracy  0.00905*** 0.831*** 0.0947*    
1900-2000 (0.00210) (0.252) (0.0409)    
       
Polity2 Index    0.0121*** 1.064** 0.126** 
1900-2000    (0.00263) (0.365) (0.0467) 
       
Geography & Climate yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Native Population  -0.0237* 2.982* 0.282 -0.0407*** 0.686 0.0570 
Density by 1500 (0.0107) (1.432) (0.269) (0.00860) (1.057) (0.168) 
       
Native State History  -0.0179 -13.26 -0.943 0.0726 4.925 0.310 
by 1500 (0.0962) (8.683) (1.388) (0.0840) (8.015) (1.069) 
       
_cons 0.126* 6.025 0.213 0.0419 -7.879 -0.474 
 (0.0618) (6.839) (0.963) (0.0574) (7.819) (0.946) 
N 24 24 21 24 24 21 
adj. R2 0.808 0.173 0.152 0.832 . 0.371 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
Table IIb: History of Democracy, Market Inequality and Asset and Opportunities Disparities. 
 
Reg (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Market 
Inequality 
Life Expect. 
Inequality  
Education 
Inequality  
Market 
Inequality 
Life Expect. 
Inequality  
Education 
Inequality 
Index of Democracy  0.00365 -0.0436 -0.0735    
1900-2000  (0.00427) (0.195) (0.316)    
       
Polity2 Index    0.00488 -0.0983 -0.00388 
1900-2000    (0.00506) (0.427) (0.00432) 
       
Geography & Climate yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Native Population  0.0286 1.957* 3.347* 0.0218 2.039* 3.485* 
Density by 1500 (0.0217) (0.991) (1.607) (0.0166) (0.863) (1.399) 
       
Native State History  -0.240 -2.581 11.56 -0.203 -3.017 10.83 
by 1500 (0.195) (8.916) (14.45) (0.162) (8.433) (13.67) 
       
_cons 0.462*** 3.075 7.317 0.429*** 3.480 7.999 
 (0.126) (5.733) (9.291) (0.111) (5.762) (9.339) 
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 
adj. R2 . 0.466 0.590 . 0.453 0.580 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Notes:  The “Geography & Climate” controls include “Sea Exposure” (i.e. the amount of the territory within 100 km of the sea), “Absolute Latitude” (i.e. distance from the 
equator, normalized between 0 and 1), and “Mean Temperature”. Please see the details on the rest of indicators in Annex B. The first stage results of the IV estimation are 
presented in Appendix B and show that, consistent with Table I, historical settler mortality is statistically significant and economically relevant even when the sample has 24 
countries i.e., all former colonies with comparable data on inequality dynamics. The sources on market inequality and redistribution are the same as in Figure 7. The IV estimation 
uses normal standard errors following the results of the IV heteroskedasticity test. Direct Taxes corresponds to taxes on income, profits and capital gains of individuals (as a 
percentage of GDP) taken as the average for the 2010-2018 period – founded on the OECD Global Revenue Statistics Database. 
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Concerning redistributive capacity, Table 2a shows that a history of democracy during the 20 th 
century is the fundamental determinant of redistributive capacity differences across countries, 
and therefore, explains the comparative inequality levels observed in Figure 10b. As shown in 
column (1) and (4) the effects of the different measures of a history of democracy on 
redistributive capacity are economically and statically very significant: a 1 point increase in the 
average Polity2 index during the 20th century leads to a 1.2 percentage points higher redistributive 
capacity. Columns (2) and (5) show a robust relationship between a history of democracy and 
substantial direct taxation.  While columns (3) and (6) shows that, for any given level of taxation, 
a democratic history increased the progressivity of the tax system – as direct taxes are typically 
progressive while indirect taxes are regressive. 
 
As such, the results presented in Table2a confirm our hypothesis that the development of a 
robust redistributive an extractive capacity is largely determined by democratic conditions: When 
governments are checked by citizens with de facto access to political voice, the state can issue the 
credible commitments to extract substantial taxes from citizens as demonstrated by columns (2) and 
(5). Consequently, the same political voice which checks (and therefore facilitates) revenue 
collection also checks expenditure decisions, and as such, will make sure that a substantial part 
of these additional revenues is redistributed back to citizens through social transfers – therefore 
leading to a higher redistribution as depicted in columns (1) and (4). Tacking both mechanisms 
together, the estimations show that going from a “slightly” non-democratic 20th century such as 
in Latin America (a Polity2 average of -1) to a “fully” democratic century as in Western 
Offshoots (a Polity2 close to 10) is associated with an increase of 11 points in direct taxation (as 
% of GDP), and a 13 percentage points higher inequality reduction through taxes and transfers. 
Therefore, the impact of democratization is very large and economically relevant i.e., a 13 points 
higher redistribution is more than two times the redistributive capacity in Latin America (6%).  
 
Concerning the results presented in Table 2b, the IV estimations show there is no significant 
effect of a history of democracy on the extent of asset and opportunities disparities. A 
democratic 20th century is not associated with a more level economic playing field as quantified 
by market inequality as shown in columns (1) and (4). Even when we analyze the distribution of 
assets per se, using UNDP data on inequality,116 this finding is further confirmed: we do not 
observe that inclusive political institutions lead to a significant reduction on education disparities 
 
116 The data on education and life expectancy inequality is based on Human Development Report (2019, table 3). 
Please see Human Development Report 2019: Beyond Income, beyond Averages, beyond Today: Inequalities in 
Human Development in the 21st Century, 2019. 
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(columns 3 and 6), nor health inequality as depicted by column (2) and (5) in table 2b. Therefore, 
it seems that “exclusionary” political institutions have not been an obstacle to develop 
“inclusive” economic institutions guaranteeing broad access to healthcare, education or asset 
accumulation as in Latin America during the 20th century, contradicting AJR and ES historical 
narrative – as well as conventional wisdom.  
 
As such, these findings confirm that the “Great Divergence” on income inequality is 
fundamentally explained by different levels of redistribution arising from divergent political 
trajectories during the 20th century, and not by asset and opportunities disparities rooted in 
economic institutions. Therefore, the results confirm our hypothesis and further contradicts the 
institutional thesis of AJR and ES. For instance, based on the results of the IV model, if Latin 
America would have had a democratic 20th century, its redistributive level would be 13 points 
higher, i.e. 19% instead of 6%, and therefore, its income inequality level would be almost 
identical than in its northern neighbour i.e. inequality would be just 2 Gini points higher than in 
the US (0.41 vs 0.39). 
 
 
VI. Exploring the results  
VI.1 The convergence of economic institutions 
Concerning the link between democratisation and a level economic playing field, while 
institutional reforms leading to lower asset and opportunities disparities in Western countries 
such as the massification of education happened in a context of expanding political voice – see 
for instance Lindert (2004),117 this was not necessarily the case in other regions – see for example 
Kosack (2012).118 De facto, most former colonies have converged towards more “inclusive” 
economic institutions during post-colonial times – irrespective of its colonial legacies or lack of 
democratic political institutions. For instance, Prados de la Escosura (2015) and Astorga et al. 
(2005), have documented an impressing catching up process in terms of providing broad-access 
to formal education and healthcare between the periphery (notably Latin America, India and 
North Africa) and OECD countries since the early 20 th century.119 Similarly, Duflo and Banerjee 
 
117 Lindert, Peter H., ed. ‘The Rise of Mass Public Schooling before 1914’. In Growing Public: Social Spending and 
Economic Growth since the Eighteenth Century: Volume 1: The Story, 1:87–127. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510717.006.  
118 Kosack, Stephen. The Education of Nations: How the Political Organization of the Poor, Not Democracy, Led 
Governments to Invest in Mass Education. Oxford University Press, 2012.  
119 Prados de la Escosura, Leandro. ‘World Human Development: 1870–2007’. Review of Income and Wealth 61, 
no. 2 (2015): 220–247; Astorga, Pablo, Ame R. Bergés, and Valpy FitzGerald. ‘The Standard of Living in Latin 
America during the Twentieth Century 1’. The Economic History Review 58, no. 4 (2005): 765–796.  
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(2011, 2014), has shown how economic institutions (e.g. access to credit, education, healthcare 
and opportunities in general) can become more inclusive (or pro-poor) in countries with “bad” 
(i.e. non-inclusive) political institutions à la AJR, such as in Africa or India.120   
 
In Latin America, institutional change towards “inclusive” economic institutions happened in 
the context of “exclusionary” political institutions. These reforms were notably implemented 
during the so-called “Import Substitution Industrialization” period (1930s-1970s), which 
promoted public investments in favour of the historically disenfranchised masses.121 As shown 
in Figure 12, this period of radical reforms did not happen in a context of democratization but 
the opposite, as the Polity2 Democracy index remained negative. The figure also shows that 
decreasing trend on education inequality clearly pre-dates the democratization process which 
only started in Latin America during the 1980s. De facto, these reforms towards lower 
“institutionalized” inequality were notably led by populist “strongman” (e.g. Peron in Argentina, 
Vargas in Brazil, Cardenas in Mexico among many others), hegemonic parties (e.g. the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party which controlled politics in Mexico since the 1930s),122and by 
de facto revolutions such as in Cuba or Bolivia during the 1950s.123  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
120Banerjee, Abhijit V., Abhijit Banerjee, and Esther Duflo. Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to 
Fight Global Poverty. Public Affairs, 2011; Banerjee, Abhijit V., and Esther Duflo. ‘Under the Thumb of History? 
Political Institutions and the Scope for Action’. Annu. Rev. Econ. 6, no. 1 (2014): 951–971;  
121 On the improvements during ISI concerning education and health, please see Astorga, Pablo, Ame R. Berges, 
and Valpy Fitzgerald. ‘The Standard of Living in Latin America during the Twentieth Century’. The Economic 
History Review 58, no. 4 (2005): 765–96. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0289.2005.00321.x.  
122 For instance, the writer and Nobel Prize laureate Mario Vargas Llosa famously referred to Mexico´s political 
system maintained by the PRI since the 1930s to the 2000 as a “perfect dictatorship” due to its proficiency in 
arranging elections. For a comprehensive analysis of populism in Latin America please see Kaufman, Robert R., and 
Barbara Stallings. ‘The Political Economy of Latin American Populism’. In The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin 
America, 15–43. University of Chicago Press, 1991. 
123 Peres-Cajías, José Alejandro. ‘The Expansion of Public Spending and Mass Education in Bolivia: Did the 1952 
Revolution Represent a Permanent Shock?’ In Has Latin American Inequality Changed Direction, 2017, 195–218. 
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Figure 12. Political institutions and education disparities in Latin America 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Sources and notes: Own elaboration. The data on education inequality (the Gini based on years of education) are 
my own calculations based on Ziesemer (2016).124 Ziesemer (2016) measures the Gini coefficients based on the 
data from Barro and Lee (2013), the series starts in 1950 as there is no data before that period. The regional average 
of years of education, as well as the Polity2 Index, are based on Table 5.4 and 9.2 from Van Zanden et al (2014).125  
 
 
Interestingly, the long list of populist movements that marked the 20th century in Latin America, 
in addition of their disregard of legitimate democratic processes, they all have in common a focus 
on improving the condition of working class households through state interventions (notably 
regulatory policy) and not fiscal redistribution.126 In line with the hypothesis of this investigation, 
it seems that building redistributive capacity necessitates the formation of a fiscal and political 
contract (i.e. credible commitments) which are unlikely to form under non-democratic institutions – 
and less so under a populist leader which builds support by polarizing society.  
 
VI.2 The divergence of redistributive capacity 
Concerning redistributive capacity, the findings formulated above do not seem to be driven by 
differences in economic development, but by differences in the democratization process as we 
 
124 Ziesemer, Thomas. ‘Gini Coefficients of Education for 146 Countries, 1950-2010’. MERIT Working Papers. 
MERIT Working Papers. United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on 
Innovation and Technology (MERIT), 29 August 2016. https://ideas.repec.org/p/unm/unumer/2016044.html. 
125 van Zanden, J., et al. (eds.) (2014), How Was Life?: Global Well-being since 1820, OECD Publishing, Paris, 
https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264214262-en.  
126 For instance, these policies included expropriations of private assets, economic distortions (e.g. price-fixing and 
multiple exchange rates to reduce private rents and increase real wages), and notably rising nominal wages.  Please 
see Sachs, Jeffrey D. ‘Social Conflict and Populist Policies in Latin America’. Working Paper. Working Paper Series. 
National Bureau of Economic Research, March 1989. https://doi.org/10.3386/w2897; Kaufman, Robert R., and 
Barbara Stallings. ‘The Political Economy of Latin American Populism’. In The Macroeconomics of Populism in 
Latin America, 15–43. University of Chicago Press, 1991.  
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will demonstrate based on the following case studies. These cases include the US in the context 
of Western Offshoots, and Chile and Mexico in the context of Latin America. The case of Chile 
will be analysed more in detail as it has a relative abundance of data on long-term inequality and 
redistributive dynamics, compared to the rest of Latin America.127  
 
The US, despite being the richest country among Western offshoots, has the lowest levels of 
redistribution among them. Consistent with our hypothesis, the latter is explained by a partially 
“inclusive” democratic history in the US, compared to Canada, New Zealand and Australia. The 
US has (in)famously constrained the political participation of non-elite households (notably ethnic 
minorities) and especially so until the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which aimed to end the persistent 
political exclusion of Afro-Americans. In the US, only 32% of the total adult population was 
allowed to vote (on average) during the 20th century, compared to 52% in Australia, 47% in New 
Zealand and 37% in Canada.128  
 
Likewise, Chile, despite being the richest Latin American country in terms of GDP per capita 
and a member of the OECD, because of a not-so-democratic 20th century, the extent of 
redistribution in Chile is half 5 times lower than the OECD average. Chile experienced economic 
development and political stability during the Pinochet Dictatorship (1973-  1990) and during 
the democratic transition in the 1990s.129 However, as shown in Figure 13 below, during this 
non-democratic period of economic boom, although social spending did not decrease, its fiscal 
incidence became significantly more regressive: “Benefits Q5/Q3” increased meaning that in-
kind and cash transfers going to the top 20% richest households expanded vis à vis the bottom 
60% i.e. average and poor households. Taxes also became more regressive: “Taxes Q5/Q3” 
decreased meaning that the fiscal burden fell more heavily on poorer quintiles and less on the 
top 20%. Therefore, consistent with our hypothesis, a restrained political voice clearly benefited 
richer households in Chile.  
 
 
 
 
127 Abad, Leticia Arroyo, and Peter H. Lindert. ‘Fiscal Redistribution in Latin America since the Nineteenth 
Century’. Bértola L, Williamson J, Organizadores. Has Latin American Inequality Changed Direction, 2017, 243–
282.  
128 Vanhanen data on political participation available at ‘Polyarchy | Clio Infra | Reconstructing Global Inequality’. 
Accessed 24 August 2020. https://clio-infra.eu/Indicators/Polyarchy.html.  
129 After leaving the executive, Pinochet continued to serve as Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army until 1998, 
and he was senator-for-life of Chile until 2002. 
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Figure 13. Social spending, fiscal incidence and political voice in 20th century Chile 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: “Political voice” corresponds to the Index of Democracy. The data on the incidence of fiscal policy on income quintiles (i.e. “Q5/Q3”) starts in the 1960s as there are 
no data for the period beforehand. Q5 corresponds to the top 20% richest households i.e.  the elite, while Q3 to the bottom 60% i.e. average and poor households. The “Benefits 
Q5/Q3” is the fiscal incidence of social spending i.e. the amount of in-kind and cash transfers captured by the elite vis à vis the bottom 60%, while “Taxes Q5/Q3” is the amount 
of taxes paid by the elite relative to the bottom 60%. It is important to note that the extent of “Political Voice” appears to be quite strong during the 1990s however this is de 
facto overestimated, notably because the Index of Democracy does not consider the specific political context of each country and, in Chile, during the 1990s the threat of a return 
to a non-democratic system continued e.g. Pinochet was Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army until 1998.  Therefore this threat limited potential reforms to the fiscal policy 
pursued during the regime.  
Sources: Own elaboration based on the data on fiscal incidence and social spending from Arroyo and Lindert (2017) which is available  online at the GPIH.130 The Index of 
Democracy is based on Vanhanen data.131  
 
 
130 Abad, Leticia Arroyo, and Peter H. Lindert. ‘Fiscal Redistribution in Latin America since the Nineteenth Century’. In Bértola L, Williamson J, Organizadores. Has Latin American 
Inequality Changed Direction, 2017, 243–282.  
131 Polyarchy | Clio Infra | Reconstructing Global Inequality’. Accessed 24 August 2020. https://clio-infra.eu/Indicators/Polyarchy.html.  
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In Chile, only since the 1990s and during the 2000s when democratic institutions had solidified, 
fiscal policy (both taxes and spending) started to become more progressive as shown in Figure 
13. However, the current level of redistribution in Chile is still lagging behind neighbouring 
Argentina and Uruguay i.e. 7% compared to 13% and 15% respectively. Consistent with the 
hypothesis, these countries have a similar level of economic development than Chile, but a longer 
democratic history which seems to explain the divergence on redistributive capacity.132  
 
Similarly, Mexico experienced relative political stability and growth under the hegemonic rule of 
the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) from the 1930s to 2000. However, the leaders of the 
PRI, which had a very different ideology than the conservative Pinochet Regime, were also 
unable to build a robust redistributive capacity. The PRI was notably unable to issue the credible 
commitments needed to achieve substantial taxation (which is essential for redistribution) as 
citizens could hardly trust a government which had no interests on checking widespread 
corruption, nor respect for democratic processes, on the top of weak checks on the executive.133 
It is no coincidence that Mexico´s tax-to-GDP ratio stands at 14%, lower than in Latin America 
(21%) and Africa (17%), and that redistribution in post-PRI Mexico is as low as in post-Pinochet 
Chile, being roughly 3 times lower than in the neighbouring US and 5 times lower than in its 
fellow OECD members.134 Both in Chile and Mexico, as in the rest of Latin America – and to a 
lower extent in Uruguay and Argentina, a limited de facto political voice during the 20th century 
hindered the formation of the state capacity and the political channels (i.e. the credible commitments 
and political pressure) necessary to levy and mobilize substantial resources towards 
redistribution. 
 
 
VII. Conclusions 
Based on an empirical and historical investigation of inequality dynamics, this paper has 
documented the fundamental role of fiscal redistribution in accounting for differences in 
inequality across regions and historical periods. The framework on inequality dynamics 
developed and applied in this investigation, as well as the novel research strategy of the 
econometrical analysis, by distinguishing between market inequality (reflecting asset and 
opportunities disparities) and redistribution through taxes and transfers (reflecting state capacity 
 
132 The average Index of Democracy during the 20th century in Chile is 6.4 compared to 9.3 in Argentina and 14.2 in 
Uruguay.  
133 Mexico average polity2 index during the 20th century was -2. 
134 Owns calculations. Please see figure 5 notes.  
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and fiscal policy) has been able to shed some light on the factors explaining income inequality 
differences across countries and regions.  
 
The evidence on historical and present-day inequality dynamics revised through this research 
challenges the conventional wisdom about the origins of world-leading inequality levels in Latin 
America, India or Africa, indicating that these inequality levels are not rooted in the colonial 
period nor explained by historically-determined “extractive” economic institutions maintaining 
an exceptionally unequal playing field – as suggested by the literature i.e., AJR and ES. 
Accordingly, this paper´s econometrical analysis using an instrumental variable (IV) strategy 
founded on historical settler mortality shows that, consistent with the evidence on inequality 
dynamics, what matters for explaining comparative inequality levels are differences in the 
redistributive capacity of the states rooted in the 20th century, and not supposedly divergent 
economic institutions between “settler” colonies (Western offshoots) and “extractive” ones,  
such as in Latin America or India. The results of the IV strategy, as well as evidence on inequality 
dynamics, indicates that present-day comparative inequality levels materialized during the 20th 
century as a result of the emergence of redistribution (progressive taxation and transfers) in 
Western countries due to full democratization, i.e. mass political participation and open 
competition. Despite that, Latin America and India have been able to recently converge towards 
“inclusive” economic institutions, due to a slower democratization process, a regressive fiscal 
equilibrium is still largely in place – thus, explaining its comparatively high inequality levels.  
 
The historical analysis developed in this investigation indicates that the origins of a regressive fiscal 
equilibrium lie in a weak extractive capacity. Both in colonial settings, as in Old Regime Europe, a 
weak state capacity forced central administrations to depend on local elites to maintain authority 
and collect revenue. A such, these elites ended up benefiting from and controlling (directly or 
indirectly through bargaining power) revenue collection and expenditure decisions in exchange for 
allegiance. The resulting regressive fiscal equilibrium that benefited the elites and bred extreme 
inequality levels (as shown in historical records) persisted broadly unchecked until the emergence 
of full democracies during 20th century. Only the de facto incorporation of poor and average 
households into politics led to the emergence of substantial progressive taxation and social 
transfers for the first time in history. Full democracies, characterized by mass political participation 
and open electoral competition, developed first and more fully in Western countries and led to the 
emergence of redistribution during the early 20th century. This explains why inequality only reached 
comparatively low levels in these places during this period. On the contrary, the democratisation 
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process has been slower in Latin America and India, and as such, this regressive equilibrium 
maintaining high inequality levels is still largely in place. 
 
Therefore, what is persistent about Latin America, India and Africa is a limited state capacity to 
tackle inequality through substantial progressive taxes and transfers. The results of the  IV strategy, 
consistent with different cases studies, indicates that limited access to political voice during the 
20th century in Latin America, Africa and India undermined the formation of the credible commitments 
from the state, as well as the de facto political representation of poorer taxpayers, which are essential 
to levy and channel public resources towards building a robust fiscal and redistributive capacity. 
These commitments are fundamental to build a solid “fiscal contract” which allows the state to levy 
substantial progressive taxation (notably direct taxes) from its citizens, who in turn expect (and 
will make sure of it through their political voice) that these proceeds are partly redistributed back 
to them through social benefits.  
 
The consequences of the divergence on redistributive capacity among countries and regions are 
severe and far-reaching. While a robust inequality reduction through redistribution helps to shield 
societies from distributional tensions and social conflict, as it does in most OECD countries, the 
combination of unchecked inequality levels (arising from a limited redistributive capacity) with 
poorly-installed democratic systems fuels social conflict and fosters a demand for populism in 
Latin America and India.135 Even relatively prosperous countries are affected by the lack of 
redistribution. This is illustrated by the inequality-fuelled massive demonstrations and riots since 
October 2019 in Chile, which have left the country at risk of experiencing the rise of populism.136 
In Chile, like in most of Latin America, a not-so-democratic 20th century hindered the formation 
of the social and political consensuses needed to solve distributional conflict through fiscal 
redistribution. Similarly, among Western offshoots, it is also not a coincidence that the US has the 
lowest level of redistribution (arising from a history of political exclusion of minorities), the highest 
 
135 Among former colonies, the US is an interesting case as it is progressively resembling to Latin America because 
inequality is increasing (since the 1980s) along with social conflict and populism. Although, as noted above, income 
inequality (and social conflict) in the US are still significantly behind Latin America´s levels.  Please see Sachs, Jeffrey 
D. ‘Social Conflict and Populist Policies in Latin America’. Working Paper. Working Paper Series. National Bureau of 
Economic Research, March 1989. https://doi.org/10.3386/w2897; Stiglitz, Joseph E. The Price of Inequality: How 
Today’s Divided Society Endangers Our Future. WW Norton & Company, 2012. 
136 Sehnbruch, Kirsten, and Sofia Donoso. ‘Social Protests in Chile: Inequalities and Other Inconvenient Truths about 
Latin America’s Poster Child’. Global Labour Journal 11, no. 1 (30 January 2020). 
https://doi.org/10.15173/glj.v11i1.4217; Concerning income inequality in Chile with respect to the OECD please 
see the OECD Income Distribution Database. 
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levels of social conflict (related to its unchecked inequality levels), and saw the emergence of a 
populist “strongman” in 2016.137   
 
 
 
137Concerning social conflict, political polarization and inequality in the US, please see for instance Stiglitz, Joseph E. 
The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers Our Future. WW Norton & Company, 2012.  
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VIII. Appendices  
 
Appendix A:  
A1. Modern Distributive Statistics  
 
Concerning the data on modern income inequality before and after taxes and transfers, the data 
comes from the OECD Income Distribution Database (OECD IDD) complemented by ECLAC 
calculations as reported in Hanni et al. (2015) for those Latin American countries not included in 
the OECD IDD, i.e. all except Chile, Brazil and Costa Rica. Despite the fact that Mexico is 
included in the OECD IDD, the data from ECLAC is preferred as the OECD data on market 
inequality for Mexico is only pre-transfers and post-taxes, whereas to be comparable market 
inequality must be before taxes and transfers as in Hanni et al. (2015) and in the case of all the rest 
of the countries included in the OECD IDD.  
 
The only data that does not come from the OECD IDD or ECLAC calculations corresponds to 
Guatemala, which is based on Cabrera, Lustig and  Morán (2015).138 The data on market inequality 
and disposable income inequality for Guatemala is comparable to the OECD IDD and ECLAC 
calculations as it follows the same methodology i.e., the same definition of market and disposable 
income.  
 
All the Gini coefficients before and after taxes and transfers used in this paper account for 
inequality across the total population, including both the working age population as well as the 
retired population in order to account for inequality across the whole of society.  
 
Figures & Details on Historical Inequality Estimates (see details for Figure 8) 
Figure 3 
The countries included in each region are: Iberia is Portugal and Spain. Latin America does not 
include the Caribbean for which comparable data on inequality is not available – the only 
exception is Dominican Republic which is included in Latin America. Eastern Europe 
incorporates Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Romania and Russia – for which data 
is available in the OED IDD. Western Europe corresponds to France, Belgium, Ireland, 
Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the UK. Central America and 
Mexico: is Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Mexico. The 
Andean States includes Colombia, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador. The Southern Cone is Chile, 
Uruguay and Argentina. 
 
Figure 5 
Changes made to Nunn (2008) data on slavery in the Americas: 
Nunn (2008) and other authors tend to overestimate slavery in Spanish America, as in some 
cases they consider every individual from African descent (including mulatos and pardos) as slaves. 
However, the same historical records show that the majority of the population from African 
descent were not under slavery during the 18 th century in Spanish America. The following 
corrections are made to Nunn (2008) data: 
 
Uruguay: The same census used by Nunn (2008) show that Montevideo in 1778 had 1386 slaves, 
562 free Africans and 538 free mulatos (or pardos) of a total of 9.298 inhabitants. Therefore slavery 
represents 15% of the total population not 26% as reported by Nunn (2008).  
 
 
138 Cabrera, Maynor, Nora Lustig, and Hilcías E. Morán. ‘Fiscal Policy, Inequality, and the Ethnic Divide in 
Guatemala’. World Development 76 (December 2015): 263–79. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.07.008.  
60 
 
Source where the census is reported: Sans, M. (2009). " Raza", adscripción étnica y genética en 
Uruguay. Runa, 30(2), 163-174. https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/1808/180813903005.pdf 
 
Chile: Nunn data for chile comes from Sater (1974) and estimates 12,5% of slaves. However, Sater 
et al. (2004) based on the same Chilean censuses of 1777-1778 account for around 5.000 slaves 
out of 700.000 total inhabitants i.e. less than 1% of total population. The large difference is 
explained because Sater (1974) made a mistake at interpreting the census data for 1777, errors that 
he corrected in 2004- As Nunn (2008), Sater (1974) also considered every mulato, pardo and African 
in the census as slave. However, most of the African and African descent population was not 
under slavery.  
 
Source: Collier, Simon, William F. Sater, and F. William III. A History of Chile, 1808-2002. Vol. 
82. Cambridge University Press, 2004.  
 
 
Figure 8. Historical Reconstruction of Income Inequality  
As noted in the “Mapping Inequality” section, the estimations presented in Figure 8 are based 
on historical records (i.e. social tables) and calculated using a shared methodology to compute 
inequality estimates that are comparable, reliable and account for inequality across the full 
income distribution -including slaves and colonizers. The estimates included here corresponds 
to the most up to data on inequality dynamics for the period studied, the figure includes all the 
estimates which meet the criteria developed in the data section.  
 
Figure 8a.  
Notes: No data” means that there are no historical records to construct inequality measures, 
such as for colonial Latin America or Brazil. In the case of colonial Haiti and Cape Colony there 
are historical records documenting income differences, but the inequality estimates for the Gini 
coefficient and the top 10% income (respectively) have not been calculated. Concerning the dates 
of each estimations based on its respective historical record, France is in 1788, Netherlands in 
1808 and India in 1807. The data for Haiti is for 1780 and top income share for France is for 
circa 1780.  Jamaica corresponds to 1774, the US to 1773 and England and Wales to 1802. The 
data for South Africa is for 1757 which is the closest estimates to 1770-1800. Besides, all the 
inequality estimates reported here are selected based on the criteria developed in the “Mapping 
Inequality” section. 
 
Sources: The sources for the data and slavery are the same as in Figure 5. The inequality estimates 
for France, Netherlands, and India comes from Milanovic et al (2011), the data for Haiti and top 
income share for France comes from Figures 4.3 and 7.2 in Piketty (2019).  139 The data for 
Jamaica in comes from Burnard et al (2019), the and estimates for the US and England and 
Wales in 1802 are from Tables 2-4 and 2-5 in Lindert and Williamson (2016).140 The data for 
South Africa is for 1757 (the closest estimates to 1770-1800) and comes from Fourie and Fintel 
(2011).141 Besides, all the inequality estimates reported here are selected based on the criteria 
developed in the “Mapping Inequality” section. 
 
139 Milanovic, Branko, Peter H. Lindert, and Jeffrey G. Williamson. ‘Pre-Industrial Inequality’. The Economic 
Journal 121, no. 551 (2011): 255–27;  
140 Burnard, Trevor, Laura Panza, and Jeffrey Williamson. ‘Living Costs, Real Incomes and Inequality in Colonial 
Jamaica’. Explorations in Economic History 71 (2019): 55–71; Lindert, Peter H., and Jeffrey G. Williamson. Chapter 
2 “Colonial Incomes at the eve of Revolution” in Unequal Gains: American Growth and Inequality Since 1700. Princeton, 
UNITED STATES: Princeton University Press, 2016. 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/londonschoolecons/detail.action?docID=4333586.  
141 Fourie, Johan, and Dieter von Fintel. ‘A History with Evidence: Income Inequality in the Dutch Cape Colony’. 
Economic History of Developing Regions 26, no. 1 (1 June 2011): 16–48.  
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Notes on historical inequality measures not included: Milanovic et al include distributive statistics 
for colonial Mexico (Nueva España by 1790) but we do not include these estimates in this Figure 
as this estimates are based on an especially “short” social tables and therefore not reliable – since 
they are calculated using evidence which lacks the sufficient detail and quality to be fully 
representative of that society. More precisely, the inequality estimates for Nueva España are based 
on a social table which includes information for only 3 social groups (the lowest amount of detail 
on Milanovic et al sample) in a very socially-diverse society – as epitomized by its complex castas 
system,  on the top that the calculations are based on the observations of a Spanish priest rather 
than on historical records (e.g. a census) as the rest of the estimates presented by Milanovic et al.142 
On the contrary, all the estimates quoted and used to construct the figures of this paper are based 
on estimations using “full” social tables, which are founded on relatively reliable historical records 
(as opposed to subjective observations or unrepresentative records) and include evidence on at 
least 8 different social groups.  
 
Figure 8b 
Notes: Concerning the dates of each estimations based on its respective historical record, the data 
for the US and Chile is for 1860, the estimate for the UK is for 1867, Brazil is for 1873 while Peru 
corresponds to 1876. The data for China, Japan, Java and Maghreb is for 1880.  
 
Sources: The inequality estimates for Brazil, China, Indonesia, Java, Japan, Peru, Japan and 
Maghreb are from Milanovic (2018).143 The data for the US comes from Lindert and Williamson 
(2016), while the estimate for the UK is from Lindert (1997) as available online at the Global Price 
and History Database.144The data for Western Europe is for 1870 and comes from Moatsos et al 
(2014).145   
 
 
142 The details of the short social table of “Nueva España 1790” and the information on how inequality is calculated 
can be found online at the GPIH - Early Income Distributions’. Accessed 16 July 2020. 
https://gpih.ucdavis.edu/Distribution.htm.  
143 Milanovic, Branko. ‘Towards an Explanation of Inequality in Premodern Societies: The Role of Colonies, 
Urbanization, and High Population Density’. The Economic History Review 71, no. 4 (2018): 1029–1047. 
144 ‘GPIH - Early Income Distributions’. Accessed 16 July 2020. https://gpih.ucdavis.edu/Distribution.htm.  
145 Moatsos, Michail, Joerg Baten, Peter Foldvari, Bas van Leeuwen, and Jan Luiten van Zanden. ‘Income Inequality 
since 1820’, in How Was Life?: Global Well-being since 1820, OECD Publishing, Paris. 2 October 2014, 199–215 
https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264214262-15-en.  
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Appendix B: Tables and Regressions  
B1, Brief Description of the data used 
 
The state history Index from Borcan et al (2018) is an updated version of the state Antiquity Index 
originally created by Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002). The index reflects whether across 
time (before 1500) the country had a supra-tribal government, the percentage of the territory of 
the (modern) country controlled by the state, and whether that government was local or foreign. 
In other words, state history is the accumulated “institutional capacity” of the country before 
1500 discounted at a fixed rate. The data can be downloaded and revised here: 
https://sites.google.com/site/econolaols/extended-state-history-index 
 
Indigenous population density by 1500 corresponds to the measure used in AJR (2002). This 
measure is preferred to Urbanization by 1500 also used in AJR (2002), namely because as 
acknowledge by ARJ the extent and data quality on urbanization by 1500 is rather limited in 
former-colonies AJR (2002).  In addition, population density by 1500 have been identified by the 
literature as a key determinant of development in the Americas as it also accounts not just for 
development but also for the extent of available native labour (Bruhn and Gallego, 2012).  
Urbanization by 1500 is partly captured by our “State History” measure which is probably better 
measured as states are easier to observe in historical records than urbanization by 1500. The data 
on State History and population density by 1500 also cover a wider range of countries – as there 
is more available data to compute them.  
 
The geography and climate controls are absolute latitude (i.e. distance from the equator, scaled 
between 0 and 1), Sea Exposure (i.e. the amount of the territory within 100 km of the coast) and 
Mean Temperature. These controls are used in AJR (2001) based on data from McArthur and 
Sachs (2001). 
 
The data on education and life expectancy inequality is based on Human Development Report 
(2019, table 3). Inequality in life expectancy corresponds to the Atkinson Inequality index. 
Inequality in education corresponds to the Atkinson inequality index of years of schooling based 
on data from household surveys. 
 
 
B2. Results of the IV estimations using the settler mortality data from AJR (2001). 
 
The results are roughly similar than the ones reported in the paper, the level of statistical 
significance and economic relevance remains the same than using the revised settler mortality 
data.  
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First Results: Democracy and Settler Mortality  
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent = Vanhanen Index of 
Democracy 1900-2000 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Settler Mortality (AJR, 2001) -4.316*** -3.792** -3.014** -3.668** 
 (0.658) (1.139) (1.096) (1.266) 
     
Geography &  
Climate controls 
no yes yes yes 
     
Indigenous Population    -1.440* -0.555 
Density by 1500   (0.550) (1.022) 
     
Native State History     -9.492 
by 1500    (9.236) 
     
_cons 26.48*** 23.28** 15.49 17.06* 
 (2.939) (8.208) (8.161) (8.296) 
N 51 40 40 40 
adj. R2 0.457 0.406 0.491 0.492 
 
Dependent = Polity2 index 
1900-2000s 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Settler Mortality (AJR, 2001) -2.684*** -3.196*** -2.742** -4.390** 
 (0.461) (0.861) (0.861) (1.270) 
     
Geography &  
Climate controls 
no yes yes yes 
     
Indigenous Population    -0.840 0.241 
Density by 1500   (0.432) (0.693) 
     
Native State History     -0.363 
by 1500    (0.207) 
     
_cons 12.87*** 18.11** 13.56* 27.16** 
 (2.055) (6.202) (6.413) (8.492) 
N 49 40 40 30 
adj. R2 0.406 0.383 0.428 0.465 
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Main Results: Democracy, Redistribution and Taxation [Using AJR (2001) settler mortality data] 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reg (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Redistribution Market 
Gini 
Direct Taxes 
 (% of GDP) 
Redistribution Market 
Gini 
Direct Taxes 
 (% of GDP) 
Index of Democracy  0.00868*** 0.00311 0.853***    
1900-2000 (0.00200) (0.00407) (0.254)    
       
Polity2 Index    0.0117*** 0.00419 1.107*** 
1900-2000    (0.00255) (0.00494) (0.326) 
       
Geography 
& Climate 
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Native Population  -0.0247* 0.0271 3.259 -0.0409*** 0.0213 0.954 
Density by 1500 (0.0104) (0.0211) (1.719) (0.00846) (0.0164) (1.183) 
       
Native State History  -0.0111 -0.230 -14.13 0.0750 -0.199 1.894 
by 1500 (0.0934) (0.190) (9.506) (0.0826) (0.160) (8.059) 
       
_cons 0.124* 0.460*** 4.931 0.0431 0.431*** -10.12 
 (0.0602) (0.122) (7.559) (0.0565) (0.110) (8.702) 
N 24 24 20 24 24 20 
adj. R2 0.817 . 0.255 0.838 . 0.271 
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B2. First Stage results of Table 2 and tests results 
First-stage results using Index of Democracy and tests for the baseline estimation (Table 2).  
(Based on ivhettest and ivreg2 commands in Stata) 
(*Political voice is the Democracy Index 1900-2000)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                          
                   _cons      16.8442   10.89323     1.55   0.140    -6.138512    39.82692
SettlerMortality_revised     -6.13109   1.833661    -3.34   0.004    -9.999776   -2.262404
    StateHist_native1500     13.15146   12.64618     1.04   0.313    -13.52964    39.83257
         popDensity_1500     -1.99552   1.303307    -1.53   0.144    -4.745257    .7542171
             SeaExposure     7.041606   4.009897     1.76   0.097    -1.418536    15.50175
                     Lat     14.97374    13.6478     1.10   0.288     -13.8206    43.76808
                    Temp     .4145625    .319243     1.30   0.211    -.2589814    1.088106
                                                                                          
    political_voice_20th        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                          
                                                  Root MSE        =     4.7763
                                                  Adj R-squared   =     0.5813
                                                  R-squared       =     0.6905
                                                  Prob > F        =     0.0012
                                                  F(   6,     17) =       6.32
                                                  Number of obs   =         24
                       
First-stage regressions
    Pagan-Hall general test statistic   :   5.425  Chi-sq(6) P-value = 0.4905
Ho: Disturbance is homoskedastic
IV heteroskedasticity test(s) using levels of IVs only
. ivhettest
                                                                              
Excluded instruments: SettlerMortality_revised
Included instruments: Temp Lat SeaExposure popDensity_1500 StateHist_native1500
Instrumented:         political_voice_20th
                                                                              
                                                 (equation exactly identified)
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           0.000
                                                                              
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005).  Reproduced by permission.
                                         25% maximal IV size              5.53
                                         20% maximal IV size              6.66
                                         15% maximal IV size              8.96
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size             16.38
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               11.180
                                                                              
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0020
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):           9.522
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                   _cons     19.54276   7.334957     2.66   0.016     4.067348    35.01816
SettlerMortality_revised    -4.586388   1.234695    -3.71   0.002    -7.191368   -1.981409
    StateHist_native1500     2.361431   8.515303     0.28   0.785    -15.60429    20.32715
         popDensity_1500    -.0892882   .8775815    -0.10   0.920    -1.940823    1.762247
             SeaExposure     2.197827   2.700063     0.81   0.427    -3.498809    7.894463
                     Lat     .3612953   9.189743     0.04   0.969    -19.02737    19.74996
                    Temp     .0337289   .2149622     0.16   0.877    -.4198018    .4872596
                                                                                          
     Polity2_1900to2000s        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                          
                                                  Root MSE        =     3.2161
                                                  Adj R-squared   =     0.4712
                                                  R-squared       =     0.6092
                                                  Prob > F        =     0.0072
                                                  F(   6,     17) =       4.42
                                                  Number of obs   =         24
                       
First-stage regressions
> rtality_revised), first
    Pagan-Hall general test statistic   :   3.837  Chi-sq(6) P-value = 0.6988
Ho: Disturbance is homoskedastic
IV heteroskedasticity test(s) using levels of IVs only
. ivhettest
                                                                              
Excluded instruments: SettlerMortality_revised
Included instruments: Temp Lat SeaExposure popDensity_1500 StateHist_native1500
Instrumented:         Polity2_1900to2000s
                                                                              
                                                 (equation exactly identified)
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           0.000
                                                                              
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005).  Reproduced by permission.
                                         25% maximal IV size              5.53
                                         20% maximal IV size              6.66
                                         15% maximal IV size              8.96
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size             16.38
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               13.798
                                                                              
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.0010
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          10.752
                                                                                      
First-stage results using Polity 2 Index and tests for the baseline estimation (Table 2).  
(Based on ivhettest and ivreg2 commands in Stata) 
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